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The characterological predisposition hypothesis posits that certain 
personality features may predispose certain individuals to depression. The 
general hypothesis of the present study was that obsessive compulsive 
personality disordered analogues (given the excessive importance of 
autonomy, achievement, and especially, personal control in their lives) 
would be more vulnernable, that is, characterologically predisposed, to the 
debilitating effects of perceived uncontrollability (i.e., learned helplessness) 
than a normal control group and an Anxious-Fearful Cluster personality 
disorder control group comprised of avoidant, dependent, and passive-
aggressive personality disordered analogues. 
A total of 136 subjects were selected for inclusion in the study based on 
their SCID-ll personality profiles and were administered a two-phase learned 
helplessness procedure patterned after Hiroto's (1974) and Hiroto and 
Seligman's (1975) studies. Furthermore, subjects were administered the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) and the Tennessee Self-Concept 
Scale (TSCS) to assess attributional predispositions to depression and level of 
self-esteem in the three diagnostic groups. 
Findings supported the basic learned helplessness effect that exposure 
to perceived uncontrollability results in performance/motivational deficits, 
cognitive deficits, and affective disruptions. As predicted, the TSCS and the 
ASQ were found to be positively correlated with one another, and Anxious-
Fearful analogues were found to have the lowest self-esteem of the diagnostic 
groups. Most importantly, findings revealed a vulnerability to learned 
helplessness in Obsessive Compulsive analogues and A..Tl.Xi.ous-Fearful 
personality counterparts based on ASQ scores; however, contrary to 
predictions, this diagnostic vulnerability was not demonstrated in the two-
phase experimental procedure. Finally, modest support for Seligman's mood 
progression hypothesis was provided (i.e., perceived uncontrollability leads to 
anxiety which, in turn, leads to depression). 
Implications and contributions of the study are highlighted, 
suggestions for future research are offered, and learned helplessness is 
critiqued and re-examined in light of the obtained findings. 
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The label "depression" commonly is used when referring to a 
dysphoric affective state. Depression can be represented on a continuum and 
can manifest itself as a harmless and even adaptive symptom characterized as 
sadness or as a serious clinical syndrome characterized by a class of co-varying 
maladaptive symptoms. The consequences of depression to the individual 
experiencing this affective state also can range from a decline in optimal 
performance to complete debilitation and even suicide. 
With regard to behavior in general, the line demarcating normal and 
abnormal behavior is not made by an exact science. Yet the importance of 
making such a distinction has generated many attempts to draw such a line. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders: 3rd Ed. - Revised 
(DSM-lli-R: American Psychiatric Association, 1987), the most commonly 
used taxonomy of psychopathology, defines abnormal behavior (mental 
disorders) as a " ... a clinically significant behavioral or psychological 
syndrome or pattern that occurs in a person and that is associated with 
present distress (a painful symptom) or disability (impairment in one or more 
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important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of 
suffering death, pain, disability, or loss of freedom (p. xxii)." Furthermore, the 
disorder is not an expectable response to a situation (i.e., uncomplicated 
bereavement). Nor is it simply deviant behavior or behavior reflecting a 
conflict between individual and society. 
With regard to depression, DSM-ITI-R assumes that normal individuals 
become depressed, but emphasizes that the degree, scope, and relative 
circumstances surrounding this "depression" determine whether or not it is 
categorized as a mental disorder. According to the DSM-lli-R, which classifies 
behavior based on topographical differences, abnormal or clinical depression 
can take on several forms. Under the diagnostic category of Affective 
Disorders, major depression, dysthymia, bipolar disorder, and cyclothymia are 
found, each variations of abnormal affective states. The focus of the present 
dissertation is on major depression, the most common of the affective 
disorders, which afflicts 9 to 26% of adult females and 5 to 12% of adult males 
(AP A, 1987) at some point in their lives and is reported to cost between $1.3 
and $4 billion per year in terms of treatment and loss of productivity in the 
United States alone (Williams, Friedman, & Secunda, 1970). The DSM-III-R 
defines major depression as an Affective Disorder characterized by a response 
topography comprised by at least five of nine symptoms. One of these 
symptoms must be dysphoric mood and/or loss of interest (most everyday, 
for a majority of each day). The other symptoms comprising the diagnostic 
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criteria are a) weight loss/gain or appetite loss/gain, b) 
insorru~a/hypersomnia, c) psychomotor agitation/retardation, d) loss of 
energy, e) feelings of worthlessness, guilt, lowered self-esteem, f) difficulty 
with thinking processes (e.g., concentration, memory), and g) thoughts of 
death and/ or suicidal ideation, plans, or attempts. In order to qualify for the 
diagnosis, it must be determined that the symptoms have persisted for two 
weeks, that these symptoms represent a change for the worse in functioning, 
and that the response topography does not have an organic etiology. 
Theories of Depression: A Brief Overview 
DSM-ID-R is an atheoreti.cal classification nosology which affords it 
certain advantages (e.g., acceptance across theoretical orientations; focus on 
objective behavior). Being atheoretical and structural, however, it does not 
address the functional nature of psychopathology. Determining what "causes" 
or "maintains" certain disorders, including major depression, has been the 
special task of theory. 
Historically, depression has been subtyped in various ways, sometimes 
consistently with the distinctions made in DSM-ID-R and sometimes 
inconsistently. One distinction that has been proposed is the endogenous, or 
organically-based depression as opposed to the exogenous, or 
environmentally-based depression. Unlike the topographical distinctions 
made in DSM-ill-R, such a distinction is based on hypothesized etiological 
origins. The conclusion drawn, however, from the unresolved nature-
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nurture debate Gohnston, 1987) is that a distinct independence of organic and 
environmental influences on depression is unlikely. Thus, major depression, 
often referred to as a reactive-type depression is probably the product of, at 
least some combination of nature and nurture influences. 
Today, there are many theories of depression which attempt to explain 
the response topography that DSM-ill-R describes. For example, genetic factor 
theories utilize family pedigree analyses, twin studies, adoption studies, and 
linkage/recombinant DNA studies in pointing to a genetic contribution to 
depression (Carson & Carson, 1984). Biochemical explanations such as the 
biogenic amine hypothesis suggest that depression is associated with amine 
deficiencies in the brain (Carson & Carson, 1984). Traditional psychodynamic 
theory argues that depression is a reaction to the unconscious or imagined 
loss of an object (Freud, 1917) and the end product of anger turned inward. 
Ferster's {1973) functional analysis states that the depressed individual has a 
defective behavioral repertoire which decreases the likelihood of positive 
reinforcement and increases the likelihood of aversive consequences, 
resulting in behavioral decrements. Lewinsohn's {1986) behavioral theory of 
depression purports that having few interactions with positive outcomes 
causes one to feel depressed; the more depressed one feels, the less motivated 
he or she is to engage in activities which might have positive outcomes. This, 
of course, leads one to feel even more depressed, which in turn, causes one to 
become even less active, and so on. Beck's (1976, 1981) cognitive theory of 
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depression suggests that a pessimistic view of self, world, and future bias an 
individual's perceptions. According to this theory, these irrational cognitions, 
beliefs~ or sche:mas di ... ectly cause the depressive emotional state. And Coyne's 
(1976) interpersonal theory of depression describes a "vicious circle" where 
depressed persons, who desire and seek social reinforcement from others, 
actually push others away as a result of their annoying "depressive" behavior. 
They then use this "rejection" as evidence to support their hy-pothesis that 
they are unloved or worthless. Upon making such an attribution, they then 
become more depressed and engage in more "depressive" behavior, which 
again pushes others even further away. 
Each of the above theories, and many not mentioned here, provide a 
fresh perspective on depression. And, given their differing levels of analysis, 
such theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Just as there are many 
theories of depression, there are many treatments for depression, many of 
which logically follow from a given etiological theory (e.g., cognitive theory 
of depression-> cognitive therapy for depression). 
The Learned Helplessness Model of Depression 
A cognitive-behavioral etiological theory, Seligman's (1975) learned 
helplessness theory of depression, is the model being used to investigate 
major depression in the present study. The learned helplessness model is 
based on the premise that, when situational outcomes are not perceived as 
being contingent on an organism's actions, "helplessness" may result. In 
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other words, when the perceived probability of a particular outcome is the 
same regardless of whether or not a response is generated by an organism, 
this outcome is perceived as being independent of responding and, thus, is 
seen as "uncontrollable." It is this "uncontrollability" that produces arudety, 
which, in turn, leads to what is being defined as "helplessness." This 
relationship between anxiety and helplessness (e.g., depression) is described by 
Miller, Rosellini, and Seligman (1986) in the following manner: 
[W]hen a man or animal is confronted with a threat or a loss, he 
initially responds with fear or anxiety. H he learns that the threat is 
wholly controllable, anxiety, having served its function, disappears. If 
he remains uncertain about his ability to control the threat, his anxiety 
remains. If he learns or is convinced that the threat is utterly 
uncontrollable, depression emerges (p. 195). 
According to the original theoretical conceptualization of learned 
helplessness, when an organism is made helpless, certain 
performance/motivational deficits (e.g., slowed response initiation) and 
cognitive deficits (e.g., insensitivity to contingencies) accompany these 
affective disruptions. These deficits/ disruptions are viewed by Seligman 
(1975) as symptoms of a reactive depression. 
Note, according to Seligman, mere exposure to "uncontrollability" is 
not enough to produce "helplessness." An organism must come to perceive 
this noncontingency. Seligman asserts that both humans and non-humans 
acquire information about contingencies, and act based on these 
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representations. In this sense, the learned helplessness theory of depression is 
a mediational theory. 
Animal Model 
Early studies of this model focused on the debilitating effects that 
response/ outcome independence had on voluntary response initiation, 
ability to learn, and emotionality in animals. In now classic studies, Seligman 
and Maier (1967) and Overmier and Seligman (1967) exposed dogs first to a 
series of inescapable shocks, and then to an escape/ avoidance task where dogs 
could jump from one side of a shuttlebox, over the barrier, to the other side 
in order to escape or avoid a shock stimulus. Note that in the first phase of 
this experiment, shock was "uncontrollable," whereas in the second phase, 
the shock could be avoided if the proper response was emitted. In the second 
phase, when signalled that the aversive stimulus was forthcoming, a vast 
majority of the dogs, instead of leaping over the barrier to "safety," merely 
laid down, whimpered, and passively accepted the shock. These "helpless" 
dogs, not only demonstrated a lack of motivation, but also showed, what 
Seligman labeled, a cognitive deficit with regard to their ability to learn. 
Contrary to Phase 1, outcomes in Phase 2 were dependent on responding, yet 
the dogs failed to learn the new contingency that they could escape or avoid 
the shock. In addition to these motivational/performance and cognitive 
deficits, most dogs experienced heightened emotionality or affective 
disruptions. These disruptions were inferred by the early researchers from the 
dogs' overt fear responses (e.g., whimpering). Other animal studies have 
assessed more rigorously this heightened emotionality by measwing blood 
pressure (Hokanson, DeGood, Forrest, & Brittain, 1971; cited in Seligman, 
1975) and ulcer formation (\Veiss, 1968; also cited in Seligman, 1975). This 
learned helplessness effect on emotion is often referred to as an affective 
"deficit" in the learned helplessness literature. However, in the following 
pages, it will be referred to as a "disruption," given that the term "deficit," 
which implies "absence of affect," may be misleading. 
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According to Seligman (1975), learned helplessness experiments have 
produced deficits/disruptions in ma..'"ly species oL~er thru.1 dogs: fish (e.g., 
Padilla, Padilla, Ketterer, & Giacalone, 1970), rats (e.g., Maier, Seligman, & 
Solomon, 1969; Maier and Testa, 1975; Seligman & Beagley, 1975), cats (e.g., 
Thomas & Balter, 1974), and humans (e.g., Glass & Singer, 1972; Miller & 
Seligman, 1975), to name a few. 
The Triadic Design 
The original learned helplessness effect has been demonstrated using a 
variety of experimental procedures. Most have used varia.11.ts of the triadic 
design. This rather elegant procedure was originally used in Seligman's dog 
studies to demonstrate that the helplessness assessed in these animals was, in 
fact, psychological in nature (i.e., the result of "perceived uncontrollabilit'j'') 
and not merely a physical side effect of the shock administered to the dogs. 
This procedure, still popular in learned helplessness research, utilizes three 
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groups. Typically, Group A subjects are first exposed to a pretreatment 
situation where they can control the experimental outcome by responding in 
some specified manner. Group B subjects are also exposed to the pretreatment 
situation; however, they are "yoked" to Group A subjects, meaning that they 
receive the identical outcome as Group A subjects but have no means of 
controlling the outcome. Group C subjects do not receive the pretreatment. 
Finally, in a test phase, all three groups are tested on a particular task 
(different than the pretreatment task) and specific performance/motivational 
deficits, cognitive deficits, and affective disruptions are assessed. Typically, 
subjects in Group A-the "controllable" or response dependent group-and 
Group C-the "no pretreatment" group-show fewer deficits/disruptions than 
subjects in Group B-the "uncontrollable" or response independent group. In 
sum, Group B subjects are made, in essence, experimentally helpless as a 
result of the pretreatment, and the effects of this helplessness induction 
generalize to test phase performance where they are assessed. Past and current 
researchers have utilized this design, and helplessness induction has been 
reliably demonstrated. In fact, a recent meta-analysis by Villanova and 
Peterson (1991; cited in Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993) which investigated 
132 human helplessness studies concluded that "the learned helplessness 
effect in people appears to be as robust as most findings in the social sciences 
(p. 107)." Many of these studies have utilized some variant of the shuttlebox 
paradigm mentioned above; however, others have remained true to the 
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triadic design while incorporating different pretreatment and test phase tasks 
and/ or aversive stimuli (See Appendix A for schematic representation of the 
triadic design). 
Depressive Equiyalent 
As was mentioned above, proponents of the theory assert that learned 
helplessness is applicable to, and procedures effective on, a variety of species 
(e.g., fish, rats, cats, dogs, humans). Of course, the theory's applicability to 
humans makes the theory particularly interesting to individuals wanting 
better to understand human depression. 
In an attempt to present evidence for a learned helplessness/human 
depression relationship, Seligman (1975) pointed to six symptoms of learned 
helplessness that have similar counterparts in depression: 1) lowered 
initiation of voluntary responses (i.e., response rate, latency), 2) negative 
cognitive set or difficulty in learning contingencies, 3) time course-symptoms 
subside if the aversive stimulus is not presented for multiple sessions, 4) 
lowered aggression, 5) loss of appetite, and 6) physiological changes (e.g., 
norepinephrine deplc.!rion). 
He also drew a convincing etiological similarity between learned 
helplessness and depression, claiming that learned helplessness is caused by a 
perception or belief that any attempt to control the environment is futile, 
while similarly, certain reactive depressions are believed to be caused when 
an individual perceives work, family life, and friendships as uncontrollable. 
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Thus, according to Seligman (1975), both the dog in the shuttlebox and the 
depressed human may come to learn that they are "helpless," and manifest 
this learning through performance/motivational deficits, cognitive deficits, 
and affective disruptions. 
Further support for viewing human depression from this learned 
helplessness perspective comes from therapeutic strategies that seek to cure 
and prevent resulting or future depressive symptoms. Studies have shown 
that the "helpless" dog who is dragged to the safe compartment of the 
shuttlebox is forced to learn that it has control over the shock in the test 
phase. Eventually, the effects of helplessness weaken and the dog is "cured." 
Likewise, the young man who is depressed and believes that he is unable to 
control his world successfully, may come to realize, through therapeutic 
intervention (e.g., cognitive therapy's hypothesis testing), that his earlier 
beliefs were irrational, and that outcomes in his life are, in fact, contingent 
upon his responses. Thus, similar strategies with the aim of getting the 
organism to experience response-dependent contingencies may be employed 
to alleviate symptoms of both "helplessness" as defined by Seligman and 
depression as defined by others (e.g., Beck). 
Also, it has been suggested, both in the depression and learned 
helplessness literature, that early exposure to response independence 
predisposes an individual to later depressive symptoms, whereas early 
exposure to response dependence or "mastery" serves to immunize against 
future depression. 
According to Seligman (1975), taken together, this evidence justifies 
and lends support for a learned helplessness model of depression, at least 
depression of a reactive nature. 
Human Studies 
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As the Villanova and Peterson (1991) meta-analysis attests, learned 
helplessness in humans has been reliably demonstrated in the laboratory. 
Using the triadic design in one of the first studies to focus on learned 
helplessness in humans, Hiroto (1974) exposed college students in the 
"controllable" group (Group A) to a loud aversive noise that could be 
terminated by simply pressing a button. The "yoked" group (Group B) 
received the same noise; however, as in the dog study, they had no way of 
controlling it. A third group (Group C) received no noise and were given no 
task. In the test phase, all subjects were instructed that they could escape the 
noise somehow. The actual response requirement was to move their hands 
from one compartment of a hand shuttlebox to another. This procedure was 
viewed as analogous to the original dog shuttlebox procedure. As predicted, 
students in the "uncontrollable" or "yoked" group performed the poorest on 
the task, at times passively accepting the noise, as the dogs had passively 
accepted the shock. Specifically, Group B subjects demonstrated a deficit in 
response initiation (i.e., their mean reaction times were slower), a deficit in 
ability to learn (i.e., it took them more trials to reach a learning criterion), and 
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a deficit on a measure that assessed both the performance/motivational and 
cognitive deficit (i.e., they failed a greater number of trials on the shuttlebox 
task). L'"l addition to demonstrating the basic helplessness effect in humans, 
Hiroto explored the effect of locus of control and skill versus chance 
instructions on helplessness induction. He found that individuals with an 
external locus of control (i.e., those who perceive events as being controlled 
by outside forces as opposed to internal forces (see Rotter, 1966)) and 
individuals given chance instructions (i.e., those who were led to believe that 
pretreatment success or failure was determined by chance) were more 
vulnerable to helplessness induction. 
In a different learned helplessness demonstration using humans, 
Miller and Seligman (1975) investigated the effect of helplessness-inducing 
procedures on both nondepressed and depressed subjects. The study utilized 
the same pretreatment task used in Hiroto (1974) but employed a different test 
phase task-a series of 20 solvable anagrams borrowed from Tresselt and 
Mayzner (1966). In addition to assessing deficits on anagram performance, the 
authors measured affect change using a self-report instrument, the Multiple 
Mfect Adjective Checklist (MAACL; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). The findings 
of the study supported the basic learned helplessness effect in nondepressed 
subjects (i.e., Group B subjects demonstrated deficits in their ability to solve 
the anagrams, were slower to initiate responses, became more depressed based 
on their self-report). Another finding was that Group C subjects within the 
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depressed group demonstrated greater deficits/disruptions than Group C 
subjects in the nondepressed group and at least as significant deficits as Group 
B subjects in the nondepressed group. The authors argued that this 
demonstrated that the effects of experimentally induced helplessness mimic 
the effects of naturally occurring depression. They concluded that the findings 
of the study provided further support of the learned helplessness model of 
depression. An interesting finding in their study that is referred to later in the 
present dissertation is that Group B subjects in the depressed group did not 
demonstrate greater deficits relative to Group A and C counterparts on the 
anagram measures as the triadic design predicts. In fact, depressed Group B 
subjects performed better on the anagram task than Group C counterparts and 
self-reported a slight mood elevation (i.e., became less depressed) on the 
depression scale of the MAACL. As in Hiroto (1974) where external locus of 
control (i.e., subject variable) and chance instructions (i.e., a procedural 
variation) appeared to influence helplessness induction, another subject 
variable was identified in Miller and Seligman (1975) which appeared to 
influence the effects of perceived uncontrollability; namely, the level of pre-
experimental depression. This finding also will be referred to later in the text. 
Hiroto and Seligman (1975) also tested the basic learned helplessness 
effect on nondepressed humans with a special focus on demonstrating the 
generality of the effect utilizing different experimental tasks. The 
pretreatment and test phase tasks in Hiroto's (1974) study were both seen as 
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"instrumental" procedures whereas the pretreatment task in Miller and 
Seligman (1975) was "instrumental" and the anagram test phase task was 
identified as "cognitive." In lfuoto and Seligman's study (1975), both 
"instrumental" and "cognitive" pretreatments and test phases were 
employed. The "cognitive" pretreatment was a discrimination learning task 
borrowed from Levine (1966, 1971) that was solvable for Group A subjects, 
unsolvable for Group B subjects, and not administered to Group C subjects. 
The "cognitive" test phase task was the same administered by Miller and 
Seligman (1975). The "instrumental'' pretreatment and test phase tasks were 
the same as those employed by Hirota (1974). Crossing type of task with 
experimental phase yielded four combinations, each of which were tested in a 
separate experiment. Hirota's (1974) learned helplessness effect was replicated 
in the instrumental-pretreatment/instrumental-test phase experiment and 
Miller and Seligman's (1975) effect was replicated in the instrumental-
pretreatment/ cognitive-test phase. Furthermore, the effect was demonstrated 
in the other two variants: cognitive-pretreatment/ cognitive-test phase 
experiment; and cognitive-pretreatment/instrumental test phase experiment. 
The authors argued, based on the findings, for a generality of learned 
helplessness in humans. In other words, the effect was not specific to 
particular pretreatment and test phase tasks. In Hirota and Seligman (1975), 
an important modification was made in the 
instrumental-pretreatment/ instrumental-test phase experiment that was 
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neglected in Hiroto (1974) and not utilized in Miller and Seligman (1975). 
Recall, in both studies utilizing the instrumental pretreatment task, Group C 
subjects were not administered a pretreatment task, nor were they 
administered aversive tones. Hiroto and Seligman (1975), however, 
determined that it was important that Group Band Group C differ only in 
perceived uncontrollability; therefore, their Group C subjects received the 
same aversive tones as their Group A and Group B counterparts. Recall, the 
triadic design prediction is that Group B will demonstrate deficits relative to 
both Group A and Group C. Interestingly, with this Group C modification in 
the instrumental-pretreatment/ instrumental-test phase experiment, Group 
B did nQ1 perform significantly more "helpless" than Group Con two of the 
three helplessness measures assessed. Furthermore, while not statistically 
significant, an inspection of the means revealed that Group C subjects took 
longer to learn the contingency, failed more trials, and demonstrated greater 
delay in response initiation than their Group A counterparts. This pattern of 
findings was not found in Hiroto (1974) or Miller and Seligman (1975). This 
Group C pretreatment modification and subsequent finding is being noted 
here because it is important in the pages that follow. 
The Reformulated Model of Learned Helplessness 
While there was empirical support for the original learned 
helplessness theory, certain problems began to emerge in the research, among 
them (a) learned helplessness could not always be induced, (b) helplessness 
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generalization from the pretreatment phase to the test phase was not always 
achieved, (c) extraneous "information" often influenced the instillation of 
helplessness, (d) different personality characteristics (e.g., locus of control) 
seemed to influence the likelihood of helplessness, (e) suicide could not be 
explained from the theory given that this behavior is nQ1 passive yet is a 
symptom of depression, and (f) the theory seemed to, by definition, exclude 
another "central" symptom of depression-self-blame. Hence, it was soon 
determined that learned helplessness was more complicated than first 
believed. 
In an attempt to address this complexity, Abramson, Seligman, and 
Teasdale (1978) revised the original learned helplessness model of depression 
by adding the self-esteem deficit to the three original deficits/ disruptions 
previously mentioned and by adding a second independent variable along 
side perceived response/outcome independence in the causal "equation." The 
inclusion of this second independent variable, "attributional style" or 
"explanatory style" addressed the original theory's neglect of the influence of 
attributions on learned helplessness. When an individual is exposed to a 
positive or negative event, he or she obviously attributes the occurrence of 
the event to certain causes. It follows, then, that how an individual explains 
positive and negative events will to a large degree determine whether or not 
helplessness will develop. Therefore, simply perceiving noncontingency may 
not be enough to produce helplessness. The perception of response 
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independence, however, accompanied by certain causal explanations for 
positive and negative events seems to be the prerequisite condition for the 
onset of helplessness. In other words, helplessness, as defined in this revised 
model, develops as the result of a diathesis-stress relationship. Possessing "at-
risk" styles in isolation (without a "triggering" uncontrollable environment) 
is unlikely to produce helplessness. Similarly, an uncontrollable 
environment without the attributional predisposition is unlikely to produce 
helplessness. According to the theory, the two conditions must be present if 
helplessness is to develop (Seligman & Peterson, 1986). Peterson and 
Seligman (1984) suggest that depressive attributional styles are shaped by 
learning experiences. Specifically, imitation of one's primary caretaker, the 
effects of teachers' reactions to one's failures and successes, and one's initial 
attributions made to early traumatic losses, all influence the acquistion of 
attributional style. 
This theoretical modification provides a more sophisticated 
explanation of the mechanism responsible for learned helplessness and 
appears to help account for the many inconsistencies that the old model failed 
to address. Abramson et al. (1978) have outlined three relevant explanatory 
dimensions (internal-external, stable-unstable, and global-specific}. The cause 
of an event, as determined by the individual, may stem from within the self 
(internal) or from the outside world (external), may persist over time (stable) 
or be transient (unstable), and may affect a variety of circumstances (global) or 
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only a particular circumstance (specific). The reformulated theory states that 
individuals who consistently attribute internal, stable, and global reasons for 
negative events and external, unstable, and specific reasons for positive 
events may be defined as "at-risk" for developing a learned helplessness 
depression. Thus, the revised model offers an advantage of predicting 
helplessness by first identifying maladaptive attributional patterns or styles. 
For example, the job applicant who attributes his failure to get a job to 
internal-"! was horrible in the interview," stable-"! am never good at 
interviews/' and global reasons--"! am incompetent at everything" (Hollon & 
Garber, 1980) may therefore be defined as "at-risk" for depression. Similarly, 
the college student who attributes her making an "A" to external-"! was 
lucky, the teacher gave it to me," unstable-"! was lucky on this test, next time 
may be different," and specific reasons-"! am competent in this class, but in 
nothing else" may be defi..ned as "at-risk" for depression. An obvious 
advantage of this theoretical revision is that potential depressives can be 
identified based on their self-reported attributional styles, retrained to utilize 
alternative attributions through therapeutic intervention, and ultimately 
protected from an unhealthy depression. 
Each of these dimensions helps define whether or not helplessness is 
likely to ensue given a particular nega.tive or positive event. In addition, they 
determine the boundaries or scope of applicability. The internal-external 
dimension determines the degree of self-esteem loss, the stable-unstable 
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dimension affects the chronicity of the helplessness, and the global-specific 
dimension addresses the pervasiveness of perceived uncontrollability 
(Abramson, Garber, & Seligman, 1980). 
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) is a self-report 
instrument that was devised specifically to assess these three explanatory 
dimensions and identify "at-risk" attributional patterns. In the 
administration of this measure, adults are presented with 12 hypothetical 
events, 6 good and 6 bad, and are asked to provide causes for the events and 
rate their responses on 7-point scales that measure degree of internality, 
stability, and globality (Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, 
& Seligman, 1982). The ASQ has generated convincing evidence that the 
internal, stable, and global attributional style for negative events is correlated 
with depressive symptoms. For example, according to Peterson and Seligman 
(1984), in the first investigation of the revised theory, Seligman, Abramson, 
Semmel, and von Baeyer (1979) tested 143 college students using the ASQ and 
a short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BPI; Beck, Ward, Mendleson, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and found that, as predicted, depressive symptoms 
correlated with the ASQ composite score(!:= .48, l2 <.001). More specifically, 
when bad events were being explained, the BDI correlated with internal 
attributions (r = .41, p. < .001), stabJe attributions (I= .34, p. <.001), and global 
attributions (r. = .35, Il < .001). Other studies lend further support to the 
correlation (e.g., Eaves & Rush, 1984; Navarra, 1981; both cited in Peterson et 
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al., 1984). 
While the ASQ has been successful in actually predicting depression 
based on internal, stable, and global attributional patterns for negative events, 
it has been less successful in predicting depression based on external, unstable, 
and specific attributional patterns for positive events (Peterson et al., 1984). 
Nevertheless, the addition of attributional style is viewed as an improvement 
upon the original theory as is evidenced by converging support for the 
reformulated theory using five research strategies: a) cross-sectional 
correlational studies, b) longitudinal studies, c) experiments of nature, d) 
laboratory experiments, and e) case studies, all of which utilize the ASQ 
and/ or similar measures (Peterson et al., 1984). 
Critique 
While the reformulated theory is considered an improvement and 
addresses some of the problems inherent in the original model, it still has its 
critics. Even with the improvements made, some argue that the procedures 
used to induce and assess helplessness are too artificial. Others are concerned 
with the mixed findings that are difficult to account for. As was noted above, 
certain subject variables and procedural modifications seem to complicate 
matters. Still others are concerned that the theory is overly simplistic, that it 
is narrowly focused, and that does not fully capture the complexity of 
depression. 
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Clearly, all depressions do not emerge as a product of a learned 
helplessness mechanism, and learned helplessness theory does not purport to 
be the universal explanation for depression. Its proponents claim that it is 
applicable to a subgroup of reactive depressions only and that a learned 
helplessness mechanism is a sufficient condition for the diagnosis of 
depression, but certainly not a necessary one. Miller, Rosellini, and Seligman 
(1986) predict that this depression subgroup may one day become formalized 
diagnostically with the creation of a diagnostic category labeled "helplessness 
depression." Such a subgroup classification potentially could be beneficial, in 
that individuals manifesting this type of depression could better be matched 
with therapeutic interventions designed to overcome the debilitating effects 
of perceived response/ outcome independence and maladaptive attributional 
styles. 
It seems that helplessness theorists and researchers make no apologies 
for their theory's circumscribed focus. With regard to other criticisms, they 
continually assert that their theory is firmly grounded in and supported by 
substantial empirical research (See Villanova & Peterson, 1991). They argue 
that the research derived from the theory is reliable and valid and that 
helplessness theory does at least as good a job accounting for depression as 
other theories of depression. 
In sum, the learned helplessness theory of depression has progressed 
from an initial focus on performance/motivational deficits, cognitive deficits, 
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and affective disruptions in animals to a reformulated "explanatory" model 
of depression that seems to apply across the human lifespan. As Peterson and 
Seligman (1984) imply, future research topics in the area of learned 
helplessness should focus on attempts to identify and "immunize" particular 
"at-risk" sub0.~.ou.ps before the actual onset of depression. It is primarily with 
this "subgroup identification" that the present study is concerned. Given the 
fact that helplessness induction is influenced by certain subject variables (e.g., 
locus of control, attributional style, pre-experimental affective state), 
investigating the influence of "personality" on learned helplessness appears 
to be a logical area to explore in the pursuit of identifying vulnerable 
subgroups. 
Personality Disorders 
Nature and Classification of Personality and Personality Disorders 
Like the construct of depression, "personality" can be defined in 
numerous ways. Traditionalists have viewed "personality" as a construct 
representing relatively enduring traits, while behaviorists prefer to view it as 
a summary term useful in describing behavior patterns. In either case, 
"personality" is often subtyped into topographically, and sometimes, 
functionally different variants. And just as "depression" can be conceived of 
as both normal and abnormal, personality, too, exists on a continuum, 
ranging from an adaptive behavior pattern/trait to a dysfunctional behavior 
disorder. Thus, a given personality feature is said to be Janus-faced in nature. 
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In moderation, it may benefit. In excess, it may harm. Furthermore, a given 
personality feature (e.g., histrionicity) may be deemed maladaptive in one 
environment (e.g., conservative business conference) yet quite adaptive in 
another environment (e.g., a Hollywood party or casting call). 
According to the DSM-ill-R (1987), personality disorders are defined as 
"endUL"'ing patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the world 
and oneself ... [that are] inflexibile and maladaptive and cause either significant 
functional impairment or subjective distress (p. 335)." Again, DSM-III-R is 
atheoretical and thus categorizes personality disorders based on relatively 
objective topographical features. In DSM-ill-R, the various personality 
disorders are grouped into one of three clusters. Cluster A, referred to as the 
Odd-Eccentric Cluster, is comprised of paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal 
personality disorders; Cluster B, referred to as the Erratic-Dramatic Cluster, is 
comprised of antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality 
disorders; and Cluster C, referred to as the Anxious-Fearful Cluster, is 
comprised of avoidant, dependent, passive aggressive, and obsessive 
compulsive personality disorders. The labels given to these clusters 
informally describe the personality features shared by members of the cluster 
(i.e., Cluster C disorders share the central feature of being "anxious" and 
"fearful"). Historically, personality disorders have been categorized in various 
ways. The current DSM-ill-R clustering actually is quite consistent with the 
psychotic (i.e., similar to Cluster A), characterological (i.e., similar to Cluster 
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B), and neurotic clusters (i.e., similar to Cluster C) referred to in the literature 
(e.g., Kernberg, 1984) and with the psychoticism (i.e., similar to Cluster A), the 
extroversion (i.e., similar to Cluster B), and introversion clusters (i.e., similar 
to Cluster C) also mentioned in the literature (e.g., Vaillant, 1987). However, 
DSM's decision to group the disorders as it has was not purely intuitive or 
solely based in tradition. Factor analyses provide empirical support for such 
groupings (e.g., Hyler & Lyons, 1988). 
There are numerous etiological theories that attempt, functionally, to 
account for the personality disorder topographies outlined in DSM-ill-R. 
Among them: biological theories (e.g., Klar, Sievar, & Coccaro, 1988), 
psychodynamic theories (e.g., Stricker & Gold, 1988; Cashdan, 1988; 
Gunderson, 1984), behavioral theories (e.g., Turner & Turkat, 1988; Swenson, 
1989), cognitive theories (e.g., Beck, Freeman, & Associates, 1990; Murray, 
1988), social or interactional theories (e.g., Endler & Edwards, 1988; 
McClemore & Brokaw, 1987}, and biosociallearning theory (i.e., Millon, 1981, 
Millon & Everly, 1985). Like the theories of depression, they approach the 
subject matter from different levels of analysis and likely each contribute to 
our understanding of personality disorders. 
Relationship between Depression and Personality Disorders 
The relatively high comorbidity of personality disorders and 
depression is well-documented in the literature (e.g., Shea, Glass, Pilkonis, 
Watkins, & Docherty, 1987). However, while there is considerable agreement 
with regard to this high comorbidity, less consensus has been found with 
regard to the nature of this comorbid relationship. 
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Farmer and Nelson-Gray (1990) address some of the relationships 
proposed in the literature and these will be summarized briefly below. 
However, none of these proposed hypotheses attempting to explain this 
relationship is all inclusive. Each potentially can serve as a useful model to 
represent the relationship and characterize certain cases of comorbidity. 
Furthermore, the proposed hypotheses are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In other words, more than one may be used to describe the 
relationship of a particular case at different points in time. Interestingly, 
while the following hypotheses regarding the depression/personality disorder 
relationship have been proposed, most of the research addressing these 
proposals has been correlational in nature. Few studies actually have 
attempted to isolate experimentally the particular mechanisms responsible 
for these relationships. 
One popular hypothesis, the complication h~othesis (Akiskal et al., 
1983) suggests that personality characteristics are shaped by depressive 
experiences. The attenuation hypothesis (Akiskal et al., 1983; Gunderson & 
Elliott, 1985) suggests that similar genetic factors are responsible for both 
personality characteristics and depression, but that personality features are 
less extreme manifestations of these constitutional factors. The modification 
hypothesis (Akiskal et al., 1983) suggests that the presence of a personality 
27 
disorder may influence the clinical picture of depression, but this hypothesis 
does not necessarily address directional causality. The orthogonal hypothesis 
(Akiskal et al., 1983; Gunderson & Elliott, 1985) suggests that personality 
disorders and depression are independent from one another but commonly 
coexist. The coeffect hypothesis (Docherty, Fiester, & Shea, 1986) suggests that 
personality disorders and depression are independent with regard to their 
psychobiological origins, but co-occur as a result of some third variable. l'he 
heterogeniety hypothesis (Gunderson & Elliott, 1985) suggests that features of 
both a personality disorder and a depression within a given individual 
emerge from different sources, including different genetic endowments. And 
finally, the model being used in the present study to broadly describe the 
depression/personality disorder relationship-the characterological 
predisposition h)!Pothesis (Akiskal, Hirschfield, & Yerevanian, 1983; 
Gunderson & Elliott, 1985)-suggests that depression is secondary to and 
emerges from primary personality characteristics. 
Recall, the learned helplessness literature points to certain pre-experimental 
subject variables (i.e., primary personality characteristics) that have been 
implicated as having an influence on helplessness induction (i.e., secondary 
depressive characteristics). It follows, then, that specific personality disorders, 
due to certain personality characteristics that define these disorders, might be 
particularly susceptible to the debilitating effects of a learned helpiessness 
depression. Since it is beyond the scope of the present study to examine all of 
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the personality disorders described in DSM-ill-R, this study examines the 
anxious-fearful cluster with special attention being given to obsessive 
compulsive personality disorder. 
Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder 
For reasons to be highlighted below, the focus of the present study is on 
obsessive compulsive personality disorder and its susceptibility to a learned 
helplessness depression. DSM-ID-R characterizes obsessive compulsive 
personality disorder, a specific personality disorder within the Anxious-
Fearful Cluster or Cluster C, as "a pervasive pattern of perfectionism and 
inflexibility, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts 
(p. 354)." To qualify for a diagnosis of obsessive compulsive personality 
disorder, at least five of the following nine criteria must be met: 
(1) perfectionism that interferes with task completion, e.g., inability to 
complete a project because own overly strict standards are not met 
(2) preoccupation with details, rules, lists, order, organization, or 
schedules to the extent that the major point of the activity is lost 
(3) unreasonable insistence that others submit to exactly his or her way 
or doing things, m:. unreasonable reluctance to allow others to do things 
because of the conviction that they will not do them correctly 
(4) excessive devotion to work and productivity to the exclusion of 
leisure activities and friendships (not accounted for by obvious 
economic necessity) 
(5) indecisiveness: decision making is either avoided, postponed, or 
protracted, e.g., the person cannot get assignments done on time 
because of ruminating about priorities (do not include if indecisiveness 
is due to excessive need for advice or reassurance from others) 
(6) overconscientiousness, scrupulousness, and inflexibility about 
matters of morality, ethics, or values (not accounted for by cultural or 
religious identification) 
(7) restricted expression of affection 
(8) lack of generosity in giving time, money, or gifts when no personal 
gain is likely to result 
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(9) inability to discard worn-out or worthless objects even when they 
have no sentimental value (p. 356; AP A, 1987). 
DSM-ill-R differentiates between obsessive compulsive personality 
disorder, an Axis IT disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder (i.e., 
historically referred to as obsessive compulsive neurosis), an Axis I disorder. 
Obsessive compulsive disordered individuals are described as having as their 
essential feature, recurrent and uncontrollable obsessions and/ or repetitive 
compulsions which are sufficiently severe to cause marked distress, to be 
time-consuming, or to significantly interfere with functioning. While the 
personality disorder and the clinical syndrome share certain features, 
obsessive compulsive disorder, an anxiety disorder, is considered a more 
serious clinical syndrome and is clearly ego-dystonic. 
The obsessive compulsive personality disorder that the most recent 
version of the DSM describes has been conceptualized in different ways and 
has been assigned different labels (i.e., anal personality, anankastic 
personality, obsessive personality disorder, compulsive personality disorder) 
over the last century. Art u..rtfortuitate consequence of tltis evolution L11 
psychiatric classification is that making comparisons across 
conceptualizations and diagnostic labels is often imprecise. Nevertheless, 
there are many points of similarity between the obsessive compulsive 
personality version described today the versions addressed in the past. 
Several psychoanalytic conceptualizations have been offered. Freud 
(1908) was the first to refer to the "anal retentive" or "anal character." He used 
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these labels to describe a grouping a sym.ptoms-obstinancy, parsimony, and 
orderliness-that were thought to be associated with the anal stage of 
psychosexual development and thought to be caused by strict toilet training. 
Erikson (1963}, another psychoanalyst, noted a similar cluster of behaviors, 
but downplayed the influence of toilet training; instead, he pointed to the 
second stage of his social/emotional development theory-autonomy vs. 
shame and self-doubt-in explaining the etiology of these behaviors. He 
argued that, a child failing to develop basic trust and fearing criticism from 
significant others, would as a defense, repress emotions viewed as 
unacceptable to those significant others and instead focus on irrelevant details 
in his surroundings. 
Horney (1937) looked to unfair, self-righteous, and authoritarian 
parenting practices as being responsible for the obsessive compulsives' 
neurotic perfectionism which she viewed as central to their character. She 
argued that hostile feelings toward the parents are controlled through self-
control and through maintaining an idealized self-image. 
Several cognitive conceptualizations of obsessive compulsive 
personality disorder have also been offered. Shapiro (1965) focused on the 
compulsive personality's cognitive style, arguing that it is characterized by 
rigidity in thinking (i.e. inability to shift modes of attention}, tense motor 
activity designed to maintain focused attention, and a distorted view of 
autonomy where activity is under external sources of control such as moral 
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principles or rules. There is, in fact, empirical support for Shapiro's 
conceptualization in the literature (e.g., Reed, 1969, 1977; Marago & Smith, 
1981; Schneidmiller, 1987). One study, for example, Schneidmiller (1987), took 
a radical behavioral approach in providing support for Shapiro's description 
of "cognitive" rigidity in thought. Namely, she found that obsessive 
compulsive analogues were more likely than histrionic personality analogues 
and normal controls to demonstrate dysfunctional rule-following behavior. 
Specifically, she found that obsessive compulsives who were provided an 
accurate rule to help them succeed on an experimental task, took longer to 
abandon the rule in an extinction phase where the rule was no longer 
accurate. Beck, another cognitive theorist and researcher, best known for his 
cognitive theory of depression, has extended his argument-Wlderlying 
schemas or beliefs are responsible for psychopathology-to personality 
disorders (Becket al., 1990). Specifically, he outlines a characteristic profile of 
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, describing these individuals as 
having a "responsible, accountable, fastidious, and competent" view of 
themselves; as having an "irresponsible, casual, incompetent, and self-
indulgent" view of others; as possessing main beliefs that "[they] know what 
is best. .. details are crucial ... people should do better;" and as utilizing main 
strategies of "applying rules, being perfectionistic, evaluating and controlling 
events." Beck (1983) argues that this personality is characterized by 
"expression of values, goals, and drives relevant to self-definition, mastery of 
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bodily functioning, and acquistion of power and control over the 
environment (p. 2)." 
In his biosociallearning theory, Millon describes dysfunctional 
compulsives as passive ambivalent individuals, meaning that they passively 
seek reinforcement from within themselves and from others. Millon's theory 
seems to address points made in both the psychoanalytic and cognitive 
conceptualizations. For example, according to Millon and Kotik (1985): 
by clinging grimly to the rules of society and insisting upon regularity 
and uniformity in relationships and life events, these individuals help 
restrain and protect themselves against their own aggressive impulses 
and independent strivings. Although the behavioral and cognitive 
rigidity may effectively shield the individual from intrapsychic conflict 
as well as social criticism, it may also preclude growth and change, 
cause alienation from inner feelings, and interfere with the formation 
of intimate and warm relationships (pp. 732-733). 
As is evident, the above conceptualizations of obsessive compulsive 
personality disorder describe the behavioral topography of these individuals 
in similar ways while pointing to different, but perhaps overlapping, 
mechanisms responsible for such a topography. 
A Brief Comparison and Contrast of Obsessive Compulsive Personality 
Disorder and Its Anxious-Fearful Counterparts 
As mentioned above, the disorders which occupy the Anxious-Fearful 
Cluster of the DSM-ill-R share certain features which justify their being 
grouped together. In the present dissertation, differences between obsessive 
compulsive personality disorder and its Anxious-Fearful counterparts-
avoidant, dependent, and passive aggressive personality disorder--are 
addressed. While detailed descriptions of these disorders and theories 
explaining their origins are not covered here, the DSM-ill-R diagnostic 
criteria are presented below to highlight topographical differences. 
According to DSM-Ill-R, avoidant personality is characterized by "[a] 
pervasive pattern of social discomfort, fear of negative evaluation, and 
33 
timidity, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as 
indicated by at least .fum: of the following: 
(1) is easily hurt by criticism or disapproval 
(2) has no close friends or confidants (or only one) other than first-
degree relatives 
(3) is unwilling to get involved with people unless certain of being 
liked 
(4) avoids social or occupational activities that involve significant 
interpersonal contact (e.g., refuses a promotion that will increaste social 
demands) 
(5) is reticent in social situations because of a fear of saying something 
inappropriate or foolish, or of being unable to answer a question 
( 6) fears being embarrassed by blushing, crying, or showing signs of 
anxiety in front of other people 
(7) exaggerates the potential difficulties, physical dangers, or risks 
involved in doing something ordinary but outside his or her usual 
routine, e.g., may cancel social plans because she anticipates being 
exhausted by the effort of getting there (pp. 352-353; AP A,1987)." 
Dependent personality disorder is characterized by "[a] pervasive 
pattern of dependent and submissive behavior, beginning by early adulthood 
and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by at least five of the 
following: 
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(1) is unable to make everyday decisions without an excessive amount 
of advice or reassurance from others 
(2) allows others to make most of his or her important decisions, e.g., 
whereto live, what job to take 
(3) agrees with people even when he or she believes they are wrong, 
because of fear of being rejected 
(4) has difficulty initiating projects or doing things on his or her own 
(5) volunteers to do things that are unpleasant or demeaning in order 
to get other people to like him or her 
(6) feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone, or goes to great lengths 
to avoid being alone 
(7) feels devastated or helpless when close relationships end 
(8) is frequently preoccupied with fears of being abandoned 
(9) is easily hurt by criticism or disapproval (p. 354; APA, 1987)." 
Passive aggressive personality disorder is characterized by "[a] 
pervasive pattern of passive resistance to demands for adequate social and 
occupational performance, beginning in early adulthood and present in a 
variety of contexts, as indicated by at least five of the following: 
(1) procrastinates, i.e., puts off things that need to be done so that 
deadlines are not met 
(2) becomes sulky, irritible, or argumentative when asked to do 
something he or she does not want to do 
(3) seems to work deliberately slow or to do a bad job on tasks that he or 
she does not want to do 
(4) protests, without justification, that others make unreasonable 
demands on him or her 
(5) avoids obligations by claiming to have "forgotten" 
(6) believes that he or she is doing a much better job than others think 
he or she is doing 
(7) resents useful suggestions from others concerning how he or she 
could be more productive 
(8) obstructs the efforts of others by failing to do his or her share of the 
work 
(9) unreasonably criticizes or scorns people in positions of authority 
(pp. 357-358; APA, 1987)." 
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While there is symptom overlap and other obvious similarities among 
t..~e disorders comprising Ouster C (i.e., that they are rigid, "neurotic," 
dysfunctional behavioral patterns characterized loosely as "anxious-fearful"), 
obsessive compulsive personality disorder can be contrasted with the others 
on several points. First, obsessive compulsive personality disordered 
individuals are more likely than their Anxious-Fearful counterparts to view 
themselves as competent (Millon, 1990, Beck et al., 1990). Second, according to 
Millon's (1987) circumplical model of DSM-ffi-R personality disorders, 
obsessive compulsive personality disordered individuals are classified as 
"autonomous" on the affiliation dimension, whereas their Anxious-Fearful 
counterparts are classified as more "enmeshed." Third, obsessive compulsive 
individuals are less likely to find their personality characteristics bothersome 
(i.e., symptoms are ego-syntonic) in contrast to dependent, avoidant, and 
passive aggressive personality disordered individuals. Of particular 
importance to the present dissertation, however, are central personality 
features of obsessive compulsive personality disorder-excessive concern with 
personal control, autonomy, and achievement-which play less of a role in 
avoidant, dependent, and passive aggressive personality disorder. Other 
important features that distinguish them from their Anxious-Fearful Cluster 
counterparts are the obsessive compulsive's rigidity in thought and tendency 
to be rule-bound. 
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Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder and Depression 
As mentioned above, the comorbidity between personality disorders 
and depression is common. Furthermore, the comorbidity between 
depression and the Anxious-Fearful Ouster, in general, and obsessive 
compulsive personality disorder, in particular, is quite high. In fact, within 
outpatient populations, obsessive compulsive personality disorder's 
comorbidity with depression is the highest among personality disorders 
according to two studies (Shea et al., 1987; Tryer, Casey, & Gall, 1983; cited in 
Farmer and Nelson-Gray, 1990). Despite this high comorbidity, an argument 
can be made that certain personality features common to obsessive 
compulsive personality disordered individuals potentially could serve as a 
"defense" against the onset of such a dysfunctional affective state. Their 
internal locus of control, for example, and their relatively positive self-image 
are personality features not commonly associated with depression. 
Furthermore, Wittenborn and Maurer (1977) argue that the obsessive 
compulsive may react to overwhelming environmental stressors and a sense 
of impending loss of control, by intensifying certain behaviors (i.e., hostility; 
denial) as a defensive manuever. Additionally, Millon and Kotik (1985) argue 
that they may attempt to block or neutralize reactions to stressful events 
through brief periods of accelerated activity which are short-lived and which 
create considerable anxiety. Perhaps, these "defenses" succeed much of the 
time and depression is avoided. In behavioral terms, it could be argued that, 
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due to their learning history, controlling their environment is highly 
reinforcing for obsessive compulsives. And, because they have been 
reinforced for persisting and even, intensifying their obsessive compulsive 
behaviors in situations where difficult tasks are encountered and eventually 
solved, it follows that, when faced with an apparent uncontrollable situation, 
persistence, not depressive symptoms, would be observed. 
Nevertheless, as the high comorbidity attests, these individuals do 
become depressed, and attempts have been made to clarify this relationship 
using the characterological predisposition hypothesis as a model. 
According to Zettle and Hayes (1982), excessive rule and self-rule 
following behavior can be be likened to "irrational cognitions" in that they 
represent rigid thinking styles that may predispose individuals to depression. 
Given Schneidmiller's (1987) finding above and further evidence of rigidity 
in thought among obsessive compulsive personality disordered individuals, 
a logical deduction can be made that such personality features in this 
population make them susceptible to depression. 
Another attempt at clarifying this relationship comes from Beck (1981) 
who asserts that obsessive compulsives, because of their emphasis on 
autonomy, control, and action, become depressed when they fail to reach 
important goals in their lives. He suggests that, upon failing to reach critical 
goals, the "self-sufficient, inner-directed, and active" obsessive compulsive 
eventually becomes "powerless, [and] devoid of initiative and self-control." 
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Similarly, Areiti and Bemporad (1980) argue that the obsessive compulsive is 
routinely rewarded with support and acceptance for achieving certain goals, 
and that when a "dominant goal" becomes unattainable, this threatens the 
obsessive compulsive's self-esteem and meaning in life. Also, Hammen, 
Ellicott, Gitlin, and Jamison (1989) argue that "a person who derives sense of 
worth, significance, and efficacy from autonomous achievement would be 
vulnerable to the impact of failure or goal frustration in the achievement 
domain (p. 155)." Such conceptualizations are consistent with the specificity 
hypothesis which argues that achievement loss may serve as a "trigger event" 
for depression in certain personality types while social loss may be more 
detrimental to other personality types (e.g., Neitzel & Harris, 1990). While 
research on the specificity hypothesis has generated mixed support, the loss of 
achievement trigger event has been implicated in the onset of depression in 
autonomous, achievement-oriented individuals (Neitzel & Harris, 1990). 
Taken together, the conceptualizations above argue that the strong 
achievement orientation of obsessive compulsives make them vulnerable to 
feelings of inadequacy and failure, and ultimately depression. 
Related to, and perhaps underlying this strong achievement 
orientation is the excessive emphasis placed on perfection and personal 
control in the lives of obsessive compulsive personality disordered 
individuals. Beck et al. (1990) write: 
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Due to their rigidity, perfectionism, and strong need to be in control of 
themselves, their environment, and their emotions, obsessives are 
very vulnerable to becoming overwhelmed, hopeless, and depressed 
when they experience their lives as having gotten out of control and 
their usual coping mechanisms as being ineffective (p. 320). 
The above quote suggests that obsessive compulsive personality 
disordered individuals might be particularly vulnerable to the debilitating 
effects of perceived uncontrollability (i.e., learned helplessness). 
Personality Disorders and Learned Helplessness 
Recall that one of the early criticisms leveled against the original 
learned helplessness model of depression was that "extraneous information" 
such as personality characteristics seemed to influence the likelihood of 
helplessness induction. The reformulation attempted to address this and 
other concerns by highlighting the influence of attributional style on 
helplessness. Recall that this reformulation improved the theory's ability to 
predict which individuais would be more likely to respond in a helpless 
manner when faced with "perceived uncontrollability." This modification 
represented an acknowledgement that helplessness was more complex than 
first conceived and that personality variables (i.e., attributional style) needed 
to be addressed and included in the model. 
Prior to the reformulation, personality influences had been 
demonstrated in learned helplessness research. Recall that Hiroto {1974) 
divided his subjects into personality groups based on locus of control and 
found that individuals with an external locus of control were more 
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vulnerable to helplessness induction than individuals with an internal locus 
of control. In addition, Thornton (1982) hypothesized that certain personality 
types were more prone to helplessness induction while others were more 
resistent. Thornton divided subjects into a prone-type group and resistant-
type group based on a questionnaire that he devised which borrowed 
questions from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventorv, the 
California Personality Inventory. and Rotter's Internal-External Locus of 
Control Scale. In line with his predictions, the prone group was more 
vulnerable to helplessness induction while the resistant group was less 
vulnerable. 
Consistent with these studies, Seligman (1975) argues that certain 
environmental contingencies can shape a child who believes that he is 
helpless and that other environmental contingencies can shape a child who 
possesses a sense of "mastery." Specifically, Seligman w:ites, "those people 
who are particularly susceptible to depression may have had lives relatively 
devoid of mastery; their lives may have been full of situations in which they 
were helpless to influence their sources of suffering and relief (p. 104) . " In 
contrast, Seligman asserts that "the most resistant individuals to helplessness 
are those whose lives are filled with mastery and extensive experience 
controlling and manipulating sources of reinforcement (p. 104)." Thus, 
according to Seligman, a learning history shapes an organism in ways that 
will influence "perceived uncontrollability" and, hence, the impact of learned 
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helplessness. 
While an argument can be made that obsessive-compulsive 
personality disordered individuals might be resistant to learned helplessness 
given the importance they place on "controlling and manipulating sources of 
reinforcement," a counterargument can be made that their excessive and 
pathological concern with "mastery" and personal control places them "at-
risk" for depression when £orced to perceive uncontrollable contingencies. In 
other words, when the obsessive compulsive's previously reinforced 
responses are no longer reinforced (i.e., his or her behavior does not control 
outcomes), something akin to extinction is likely to occur. It is this 
counterargument in this Janus-faced debate that is being taken in the present 
study. Just as in the specificity hypothesis where autonomous individuals 
become depressed when they experience a loss of reinforcement (i.e., when 
their autonomy is threatened) and where sociotropic individuals become 
depressed when they experience a loss of reinforcement (i.e., when their 
social status/ acceptance is threatened), it is being proposed here, that 
obsessive compulsive personality disordered individuals will become 
depressed when they experience a loss of reinforcement (i.e., when their 
personal control is threatened). While other obsessive compulsive features--
emphasis on autonomy and achievement; rigid, rule-bound thinking--
probably contribute to a learned helplessness vulnerability, the obsessive 
compulsive's pathological emphasis on personal control is being viewed as 
central to this vulnerability hypothesis, given that "perceived 




Statement of Purpose 
To date, most of the research addressing the relationship between 
personality disorders and depression has been correlational in nature. The 
present study attempted experimentally to investigate a particular 
relationship between obsessive compulsive personality disorder and 
depression-a relationship consistent with the characterological 
predisposition hypothesis. The learned helplessness model of depression was 
the theoretical perspective from which this comorbid relationship was 
analyzed. 
The general hypothesis of the dissertation was that obsessive 
compulsive personality disordered analogues (given the excessive 
importance of autonomy, achievement, and especially, personal control in 
their lives) would be more vulnerable, that is, characterologically 
predisposed, to the debilitating effects of perceived uncontrollability (i.e., 
learned helplessness) than a normal control group and an Anxious-Fearful 
personality disordered control group comprised of avoidant, dependent, 
and/ or passive-aggressive analogues. Converging support for such a 
hypothesis comes from research demonstrating that the obsessive 
compulsive personality style may be susceptible to perceived uncontrollability 
as a trigger event and from research demonstrating rigidity of thought and 
over-reliance on rules in this population. This vulnerability hypothesis was 
forwarded despite the fact that a plausible argument can be made that certain 
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obsessive compulsive personality features (i.e, internal locus of control, 
motivation to excel in achievement endeavors) could serve as protective 
features in the short-term. Reconciling these two arguments (vulnerability 
vs. resistance) in light of the obtained findings was attempted. 
The present study attempted to demonstrate a learned helplessness 
vulnerability in obsessive compulsive personality disordered analogues using 
a partial replication of Hiroto (1974) and Hiroto and Seligman's (1975) escape-
avoidance hand shuttlebox procedure. Specifically, a two-phase learned 
helplessness protocol was administered to all participants. 
1. It was predicted that Group B subjects who are given a 
response-independent task in the pretreatment phase of the triadic design 
administration would show more pronounced affective disruptions and 
more pronounced performance/motivational and cognitive deficits on a 
response-dependent task administered in the test phase as compared to 
subjects given either a response-dependent task (Group A) or no task (Group 
C) in the pretreatment phase. In other words, it was predicted that Group B 
subjects made experimentally helpless in the pretreatment phase would 
perceive this uncontrollability, would predict that future outcomes are 
independent of their actions, would become more affectively distressed, 
would take longer to initiate responses and reach a learning criterion, and 
would perform more poorly on a solvable task compared to triadic 
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counterparts. Hence, the basic learned helplessness effect was predicted. 
2. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it was predicted that obsessive 
compulsive Group B subjects would demonstrate greater learned helplessness 
deficits relative to Group B subjects in the two control groups. 
3. In addition, it was predicted that both of the personality disorder analogue 
groups, especially the obsessive compulsive personality analogue group, 
would provide relatively more internal, stable, and global reasons for 
negative events and more external, unstable, and specific reasons for positive 
events on the Attributional Style Questionnaire. In other words, it was 
predicted that both analogue groups, particularly obsessive compulsives, 
would be identified as being more "at-risk" of developing a learned 
helplessness depression than normal controls. Furthermore, it was 
hypothesized that Group B subjects identified as more "at-risk" would 
actually behave in more helpless manner in reaction to perceived 
uncontrollabili ty in the experiment. 
4. The Tennessee Self-Concept Seek was also administered to clarify the 
relationship between self-esteem and attributional style. Specifically, a 
significant correlation between "trait" self-esteem and "trait" attributional 
style was predicted. As for specific diagnostic predictions, it was hypothesized 
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that Anxious-Fearful controls would self-report lower self-esteem than 
normal controls. Given past research on obsessive compulsive personality 
disordered individuals' self-perceptions, obsessive compulsive analogues in 
this study were not predicted to differ significantly from normal controls with 
regard to their self-esteem. 
5. A secondary research hypothesis addressed by the present study concerned 
the hypothesized mood progression in the development of a learned 
helplessness depression described by Seligman (1975) and Miller, Rosellini, 
and Seligman {1986). It was hypothesized that, upon "perceiving 
uncontrollability," Group B subjects' scores on the Multiple Affect Adjective 
Checklist would indicate a progression in mood from anxiety to depression 
over the course of helplessness induction. Recall, Seligman argues that, when 
organisms are first exposed to uncontrollability, their behavior is 
characterized more by anxiety (i.e., they get agitated and become energized-
responses which often help organisms overcome obstacles and regain 
control). However, after some time of experiencing continued failure to 
control outcomes, this anxious affective state is replaced by a depressive 
affective state and other accompanying learned helplessness deficits. Prior to 
this study, little researu."l had attempted to capture this mood progression 
experimentally. 
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Given the relatively high comorbidity rate between obsessive 
compulsive personality disorder and major depression in outpatient samples, 
the present investigation has significant clinical implications. Namely, 
demonstrating this learned helplessness vulnerability would address directly 
Peterson and Seligman's (1984) charge for future learned helplessness 
research to identify "at-risk" subgroups and would identify a possible "trigger 
event" for depression in obsessive compulsive disordered individuals-
"perceived uncontrollability." Furthermore, identifying unconqollability as a 
"trigger event" in this group potentially could influence psychotherapeutic 
decisions designed to treat both the depression and the personality disorder, 
and might have implications for the prevention of both as well. These 





A total of 136 female undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at 
the University of North Carolina-Greensboro participated in the study. They 
were selected based on their scores on the self-report version of the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (SCID-ll; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbons, & First, 
1990) which was administered during mass screening sessions at the 
beginning of several semesters (See Table 1 for participants' SCID-ll scores; 
Table 1 and all other tables are located in Appendix B). 
A total of 45 subjects comprised the Obsessive-Compulsive Personality 
Disorder analogue group (OCPD). These subjects were found to meet the 
diagnostic criteria on the Obsessive-Compulsive scale of the SCID-ll (i.e., they 
self-reported at least 5 of 9 criteria). A subset of this group (n=23) were 
identified as "pure" OCPDs in that they did not meet the diagnostic criteria on 
any of the remaining personality scales. The remainder of this group (n=22) 
were identified as "non-pure" OCPDs in that they met the diagnostic criterion 
on one additional personality scale outside the Anxious-Fearful Cluster (i.e., 
Avoidant, Dependent, or Passive-Aggressive). Analyses conducted using only 
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the pure group generated a pattern of findings similar to analyses using the 
combined group, hence, justifying the use of the combined group. Utilizing 
this combined group increased the statistical power of the analyses. Therefore, 
the acronym "OCPD," used throughout the text, refers to the two subgroups 
combined. 
A total of 45 subjects comprised the Anxious-Fearful Control group 
(AFC). These subjects were found to meet the diagnostic criteria on one or 
more of the Anxious-Fearful Cluster personality scales except for the 
Obsessive-compulsive scale of the SCIO-n (i.e., Avoidant-at least 4 of 7 
criteria, Dependent-at least 5 of 9 criteria, and/or Passive-Aggressive scales-at 
least 5 of 9 criteria). A subset of this group (n= 24) were identified as "pure" 
AFCs in that they did not meet the diagnostic criteria on any of the remaining 
personality scales. The remainder of this group (n=21) were identified as "non-
pure" AFCs in that they met the diagnostic criterion on one additional 
personality scale outside the Anxious-Fearful Cluster. Again, analyses 
conducted using only the pure group generated a pattern of findings similar 
to analyses using the combined group, hence, justifying the use of the 
combined group. Utilizing this combined group increased the statistical 
power of the analyses. Therefore, the acronym "AFC," used throughout the 
text, refers to the two subgroups combined. 
A total of 46 subjects comprised the Normal Control group (NC). These 
subjects did not meet the diagnostic criteria on any of the SCID-II personality 
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scales. 
In addition to the above selection criteria, all subjects were screened for 
depression using the Beck Depression Inventory immediately prior to 
participating in the experiment. Only non-severely depressed subjects with 
scores of 20 or below were actually included in the study. Two subjects (not 
included in the totals cited above) met the SCID-II criteria for inclusion in the 
study but scored above the BDI depression cut-off point used in this study. 
They were not administered the procedure but, instead, were given a special 
debriefing. Futhermore, only subjects who reported no significant hearing or 
ear problems were included in the study given that an aversive tone was 
presented periodically throughout the experimental procedure. 
Within each diagnostic category (i.e., OCPD, AFC, NC), subjects were 
assigned to one of three triadic groups (i.e., A, B, or C). The number of subjects 
per cell when diagnostic group and triadic group are crossed follow: OCPD-
Group A = 15; OCPD-Group B = 15; OCPD-Group C = 15; AFC-Group A = 16; 
AFC-Group B = 14; AFC-Group C = 15; NC-Group A= 16; NC-Group B = 15; 
NC-Group C = 15. Triadic groups were assumed comparable with regard to age 
and race by using simple random assignment within diagnostic group. 
Subjects were compensated for their participation with either research 
credits or money. The treatment of all participants was in accordance with the 
ethical standards of the American Psychological Association (See Ethical 




The Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire--Revised (Hyler & Reider, 
1984), also referred to as the self-report version of the Structured Clinical 
Interview for the PSM-ID-R: Personality Disorders (SCID-TI) (Spitzer et al., 
1990), is a 130-item self-report screening instrument that assesses personality 
disorder symptoms which directly correspond to the personality disorder 
classification system of the DSM-ill-R Subjects simply respond affirmatively 
or negatively to the items. In contrast to the more thorough SCID-ll 
Interview, the self-report version results in a high false positive rate (Reich, 
1989). Thus, it is not appropriate to use this instrument in isolation to 
diagnose personality disorders. Instead, it should be used as a screening tool 
by clinicians in diagnosing individuals with suspected personality disorders. 
Due to its high false positive rate, results obtained from studies utilizing this 
self-report measure only are often diluted, however, and must be interpreted 
with this shortcoming in mind. Nevertheless, the advantages of the self-
report version of the SCID-ll are its correspondence to the DSM-Ill-R 
categories and the ease with which it can be administered. The self-report 
version of the SCID-II has been used as a screening measure in previous 
research (e.g., Levin & Hyler, 1986; Yager, Landsverk, Edelstein, & Hyler, 1989) 
and both adequate reliability and validity coefficients have been demonstrated 
(e.g., O'Boyle & Self, 1990; Reich, 1989; Spitzer et al., 1990). 
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The Beck Dgpression Inyentocy (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) is a 21-item self-report measure designed to assess current 
severity of depression. For each item, respondents are required to choose the 
most self-descriptive statement from among four alternatives that 
characterizes their psychological state over the last two weeks. These 
statements are graded in severity a1"1d are assigned values (i.e., 0-3, 3=most 
severe) which are summed over all21 items. Beck and Beamesderfer (1984) 
suggest that cut-off scores should be based on the purpose of the assessment 
and the decisions to be made as a result of the assessment. Different cut-off 
scores for different levels of depression have been suggested in the literature; 
however, there is general agreement that scores above 20 are commonly 
associated with severe depression (e.g., Steer, Beck, & Garrison, 1985). Of the 
three "triple response" modalities, the BDI emphasizes the cognitive-verbal 
channel, although affective, motivational, and physiological symptoms are 
assessed. The BDI has been found to have adequate test-retest reliability (e.g., 
Tennen, Herzberger, & Nelson, 1987), concurrent and predictive validity (e.g., 
Beck, 1967), and internal consistency (e.g., Tennen et al., 1987). 
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson, Semmel, von 
Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982) is a self-report instrument 
that was devised specifically to assess the three "explanatory" dimensions 
proposed in the reformulated learned helplessness theory and identify "at-
risk" attributional patterns. Adults are presented with 12 hypothetical events 
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(i.e., 6 with positive outcomes and 6 with negative outcomes) and then are 
asked to provide causes for the events and rate their responses on 7-point 
scales that measure the attributions' degree of internality, stability, globality, 
and importance. The ASQ's psychometric properties are sound and are 
reviewed in Tennen and Herzberger (1986). 
The Tennessee Self-Concept Scale-Clinical and Research Form (TSCS; 
Fitts, 1965) is a 100-item self-report measure that assesses what an individual 
"is, does, likes, and feels" (p. 663) (Walsh, 1984). Respondents rate self-
statements on a 5-point scale ranging from "completely false" to "completely 
true." This instrument provides 29 scores, including, among others, a global 
self-esteem measure and informative subscales that tap various intemai 
aspects of self-concept (i.e., identity, behavior, and self-satisfaction) and 
external aspects of self-concept (i.e., moral-ethical, social, personal, physical, 
and family). It has been utilized extensively in both clinical work and research 
and is considered to have respectable reliability and validity (See Fitts, 1965, 
and Walsh, 1984, for extensive reviews of psychometric properties of the 
TSCS). 
The Multiple Mfect Adjective Checklist-Today Form (MAACL; 
Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel, & Valerius, 1964) is a 132-item self-report 
instrument that yields three empirically derived affective state scales: 
Depression, Anxiety, Hostility. Respondents simply endorse adjectives that 
describe how they feel. This measure is sensitive to daily or "here-and-now" 
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fluctuations in mood. This advantage, along with the fact that it is easy and 
quick to administer, make it ideal for repeated measures. According to the 
literature, the MAACL has adequate reliability and validity (e.g., Zuckerman 
& Lubin, 1965; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985). Its popularity among researchers is 
evidenced in Lubin, Zuckerman, and Woodward's (1985) bibliography of 716 
published articles and dissertations that have used this measure. 
The D~ression Adjectiye Checklist (DACL; Lubin, 1966) is a 32-item 
self-report instrument that assesses state changes in depressive mood. While 
it does not provide multiple affective state assessment like the MAACL, its 
advantage is that it is even quicker to administer than the MAACL. Like the 
MAACL, it has adequate reliability and validity (e.g., Lubin & Himelstein, 
1976). Seven parallel forms of this measure are available. The inter-form 
correlations are quite high (i.e., parallel form reliability) which justifies the 
use of alternate versions (Petzel, 1985). In the present study, only Form A was 
utilized given that the DACL was administered only once. 
In the present study, two measures were devised by the experimenter. 
The first measure, an Expectancy Rating Form was used to assess the degree to 
which subjects had confidence in their future performance on a given task. 
They were asked to rate on an 11-point scale how well they thought they 
would do on an upcoming task to which they had not yet been exposed (i.e., 
O=No confidence in success, lO=Complete confidence in success). Tne second 
measure devised by the investigator was a Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
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designed to assess various process measures that were included to clarify any 
predicted or unpredicted findings. Copies of both of these measures can be 
found in Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively. 
Shuttlebox Apparatus 
A CompuAdd 286 personal computer (including hard drive, monitor, 
and keyboard) was used to administer the experimental protocol. A black dot 
was affixed to both the space bar and the 'H" key on the keyboard, a red dot 
was affixed to the "8" key on the number pad, and a blue dot was affixed to 
both the "4" and "6" keys on the number pad (an explanation for these dots is 
provided in the next section). A 151/2" by 8" cardboard keyboard cover was 
utilized that could be easily moved by the experimenter to expose or conceal 
the marked keys. Written on the keyboard cover was the following statement: 
"Do not remove this cover." 
Several graphics were displayed on the computer monitor during the 
experimental protocol. These graphics are described in the next section. 
The computer generated a tone which was directed through an 
attenuator (Hewlett Packard, 350 D Attenuator Set, 5W-55V, 600, DC-IMC), 
through an adaptor (Grayson-Stadler, Co., 400/600 Ohms) and finally through 
a set of headphones (Grayson-Stadler, Co., TDH39-10Z; MX-41/ AR pads). The 
frequency of the tone was set at 3000Hz, but the intensity of the tone could be 
manipulated by the experimenter using the attenuator dial. Tone intensity 
could range from 60 to 100 dB in 5 dB increments. 
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A BASIC program was designed to administer the protocol and collect 
data. Data output was printed on an Epson LX-800 printer. 
Procedure 
A procedural schemata of the present study is presented in Appendix E 
and may be referred to as needed. Recall that the present study is a partial 
replication of the 2-phase learned helplessness protocol used by Hiroto (1974) 
and Hiroto and Seligman (1975). As the present study is detailed, attention is 
given to the primary differences between the present and above studies with 
regard to procedure. Furthermore, the rationale behind these modifications is 
given. 
Testing time blocks of one and one-half hours were reserved for each 
participant, and details concerning date, time, and place of testing were 
discussed in advance. The protocol was administered by one of four trained 
experimenters. Experimenters followed a standardized administration 
procedure in order to lessen the possible effect of different administration 
"styles." Before testing began, an informed consent was signed by the 
participant (See Appendix F for copy of Informed Consent). Next, each subject 
was administered the BDI in order to rule out the presence of depression. If a 
subject scored above 20 on the BDI, the testing was discontinued and a special 
debriefing statement was given (See Appendix G for Special Debriefing A and 
B). If a subject scored 20 or below, testing was continued, and the ASQ and 
TSCS were administered in a randomly determined order for each subject. 
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Each subject read the instructions to these questionnaires herself and 
completed them at her own pace, alone in a laboratory room. 
Next, the subject was escorted to the testing room where she was read 
the following instructions: 
Before we get started, there are a few more things that we need to do. 
First, we need to select a volume level that you find to be slightly 
unpleasant. This will be the volume level that will be presented 
throughout the experiment. I'm going to present a series of tones, 
starting at a low level and then, increasing in volume. I'd like you to 
raise your hand high when you find a particular noise slightly 
unpleasant. Again, I won't present any noises that are 
considered dangerous. We'll do this several times and I'll start each 
series from a different volume level. Remember, raise your hand high 
when you find the noise slightly unpleasant. 
Recall that in Hiroto and Seligman's (1975) human version of 
Seligman's dog shuttlebox study, an aversive tone was used as the aversive 
stimulus instead of shock. A tone of 3000 Hz and 90 dB was administered to 
all subjects in their study. In the present study, all subjects were administered 
a tone of 3000 Hz, but were instructed to select a dB level that they personally 
found "slightly unpleasant." This modification was made for ethical reasons 
and to insure that subjects were equated on their subjective perception of 
aversiveness. Tones, ranging from 60 to (potentially) 100 dB, were presented 
in ascending order of 5 dB increments over four trials. Each trial began at a 
different dB level and was comprised of a series of tones. An average of the 
decibels levels selected over the four trials was calculated on each subject and 
was used as the "slightly unpleasant" noise level presented during the 
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procedure for that particular subject. No significant differences among triadic 
groups or diagnostic groups were noted with regard to decibel level selection. 
After the decibel level was selected, the subject was given the first 
administration of the MAACL (MAACL1) and was read the following 
instructions: 
Now I'm going to give you another brief questionnaire. On this sheet 
you will find words which describe different kinds of moods and 
feelings. Mark an "X" in the boxes beside the words which describe how 
you feel now-today. Some of the words may sound alike, but we want 
you to marls aU of the words that describe your feelings. Please read the 
words carefully, work rapidly, and tell me when you are through. 
After the subject completed the checklist, she was given the first 
administration of the Expectancy Rating form (ER1) which asked the subject 
to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how well she thought she was going to do on an 
upcoming task (0 = Poorly; 10 =Very Well). 
Learned Helplessness Procedure 
At this point in the protocol, the subject was administered the 2-phase 
learned helplessness procedure. The procedure differed depending on triadic 
group assignment. Recall, subjects in all three diagnostic groups were 
randomly assigned to one of three triadic groups, Group A-the response 
dependent group, Group B-the response independent group, and Group C--
the "no-pretreatment" group. As mentioned above, this procedure was a 
partial replication of Hiroto (1974) and Hiroto and Seligman's (1975) study. As 
in both studies, Group A subjects were presented with a solvable 
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pretreatment task, Group B subjects were presented with an unsolvable 
pretreatment task, and Group C subjects were not administered a formal 
pretreatment. The present study utilized the aversive tone modification 
made in Hiroto and Seligman (1975) which corrected for the design flaw in 
Hiroto (1974). Namely, Group C subjects did not receive a pretreatment task, 
but were administered the same aversive tones as Group A and Group B. 
Recall, this modification was seen as important because it equated all groups 
on exposure to the physical stimulus and helped isolate perceived 
uncontrollability as the mechanism responsible for the noted 
deficits/ disruptions. Finally, in the test phase, all subjects were administered a 
solvable hand shuttlebox task where learned helplessness deficits were 
assessed. 
In the present study, several modifications were made in the 
procedure. Some attention now is paid to the differences between the present 
study and Hiroto's (1974) and Hiroto and Seligman's (1975) studies. It was 
decided to computerize the 2-phase procedure in the present study in order to 
make the administration of the task easier and data collection more precise. 
Instead of using an actual box with a knob protruding from the top in the test 
phase, the modified shuttlebox was graphically displayed on the computer 
monitor. Instead of sliding the knob from one end of the box to the other in 
order to terminate the noise, subjects were required to figure out a sequence 
of key presses that would move a cursor across the screen from one box to 
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another. The response requirement, determined during pilot work, was such 
that an adequate range of performance was produced (i.e., some subjects 
never learned the sequence, others caught on immediately, and most fell 
somewhere in between). 
Several more modifications were made to the pretreatment phase of 
the procedure that were not part of Hiroto's (1974) or Hiroto and Seligman's 
(1975) studies. In piloting the procedure for the present study, it was found 
that many Group B subjects were making an external attribution regarding 
their failure during the pretreatment phase. For example, many subjects 
reported that they suspected that the computer was programmed to make 
terminating the noise impossible (i.e., given that they had exhausted all 
response options). It was reasoned that making such an external attribution 
might make helplessness induction and generalization less likely to occur. 
Subjects in the initial pilot work, like subjects in the Hiroto (1975) and Hiroto 
and Seligman (1975) studies, were presented with a single button and asked to 
"do something" to stop the noise. In further pilot work, the pretreatment 
phase was complicated by adding a second "dummy" key that actually had no 
control over the noise. Also, each time the space bar was pressed, a graphically 
displayed square appeared on the monitor. Group B pilot subjects exposed to 
this new procedure were more likely to make an internal attribution (i.e., to 
attribute their failure to their inability to ''break the code" and not to the task 
being impossible). 
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Another modification was to divide the pretreatment phase into two 
distinct blocks. The procedure for the two blocks was the same, but they were 
separated by a short interval of time. This modification was made for two 
reasons. The first reason was to facilitate further an internal attribution for 
failure in Group B subjects. For example, if experi..mentally sophisticated 
subjects were i.Pltially likely to attribute their failure to the task being 
impossible and also suspected that, in the next phase, they would have 
control over outcomes, it was reasoned that their initial attributions would 
more likely change to internal attributions upon receiving a second identical 
block. Secondly, dividing the pretreatment into two blocks made possible 
administering the MAACL at the midpoint of the pretreatment phase in 
addition to the beginning and end of the pretreatment phase as had been 
done in previous research. Thus, affect in the first half of the pretreatment 
phase could now be compared with affect in the second half of the 
pretreatment phase to investigate experimentally the mood progression from 
anxiety to depression posited by Seligman (1975) and Miller, Rosellini, & 
Seligman (1986). To avoid confusion, the first half of the pretreatment phase 
will be referred to as "Block 1," the second half of the pretreatment phase will 
be referred to as "Block 2," and the test phase will be referred to as "Block 3." 
Block 1 
After the first administration of the Expectancy Rating form, Group A 
and Group B subjects were read the following directions: 
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Please listen to these instructions carefully. I am not allowed to give 
you additional w.formation other than what I am about to tell you. I 
will answer any questions you may have at the end of the experiment. 
From time to time a slightly unpleasant noise will come on for awhile. 
When that noise comes on there is something you can do to stop it. 
I'm not going to tell you how to stop it, but I will give you a hint. It 
involves pressing one or both of the marked keys in some way. A 
feedback screen will appear on the computer monitor after each noise. 
The feedback screen will tell you how the noise on each trial was 
stopped. After any given noise, if you find the way to stop the noise, 
then the screen will say "Congratulations. You stopped the noise." 
After any given noise, if you don't stop the noise yourself, then the 
screen will say, "Sorry, the noise stopped automatically." Please be sure 
to look up at the screen after each noise to see how you did. It is 
possible to stop each noise yourself. Remember, the goal is to stop the 
noise yourself by doing something. Do you understand these 
instructions? Taking the headphones off, dismantling the apparatus, 
and removing the keyboard cover will not help you stop the noise so 
please don't do any of those things. I'll be next door and return when 
t..lUs part of the experiment is over. 
The following reminder was printed on a sheet of paper and affixed 
below the computer monitor: ''Your job is to stop the noise by doing 
something. Hint Use one or both of the marked keys in some way." The 
experimenter then left the room and returned after 25 trials had been 
administered. 
Group C subjects were read the following instructions instead: 
Please listen to these instructions carefully. I am not allowed to give 
you additional information other than what I am about to tell you. I 
will answer any questions that you may have at the end of the 
experiment. From time to time a slightly unpleasant noise will come 
on for awhile. Please sit and listen to it. I'll be next door and I'll return 
when this part of the experiment is over. 
The following reminder was printed on a sheet of paper and affixed 
below the computer monitor: "Just sit and listen to the noise." Again, the 
experimenter then left the room and returned after 25 trials had been 
administered. 
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During Block 1, Group A and B subjects were administered a series of 
25 self-selected tones. The intertrial interval duration between the offset of 
each tone and the onset of the next tone was predetermined and the same for 
all subjects. For Group A subjects, the duration of each tone was determined 
by the subject. Each Group A subject could terminate the noise by pressing the 
space bar (marked with a black dot) four consecutive times. H a correct 
response was not made, the tone terminated automatically after 5 seconds. At 
the offset of a given tone, Group A subjects were given accurate feedback on 
their performance. Each Group B subject was yoked to a Group A subject. In 
other words, each Group B subject received the same intertrial interval 
durations and tone durations as a Group A counterpart. However, Group B 
subjects always received feedback that they had failed to terminate the noise. 
No response on their part could terminate the noise. Group C subjects were 
also yoked to a Group A subject. They received the same intertrial interval 
durations and tone durations but were not given feedback on their 
performance given that they were not required to terminate the noise. In 
essence, they were not administered the pretreatment task but were equated 
with Group A and B subjects with regard to total time elapsed during Block 1 
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and with regard to exposure to the aversive stimulus. Again, the 
pretreatment phase in this experiment is where helplessness is induced in 
Group B subjects and where Group A and C subjects serve as controls, helping 
to isolate the effects of uncontrollability. 
After the completion of the first half of the pretreatment phase, all 
subjects were given the second administration of the MAACL (MAACL2) and 
were read the following instructions: 
This is that same questionnaire you filled out earlier. Your answers 
may or may not be the same as they were before-that is not important. 
The important thing is to check off all those adjectives that describe 
how you are feeling right now-at this yery moment. Please read the 
words carefully, work rapidly, and tell me when you are through. 
Block 2 
Next, the second half of the pretreatment was administered and the 
following instructions were read to all subjects: 
I'm going to start it up again. The instructions are the same as before. I 
will answer any questions you may have at the end of the experiment. 
Block 2 was identical to Block 1. Another series of 25 tones was 
presented with the same instructions as in Block 1. Again, Group B subjects 
were being made experimentally helpless, and Group A and C subjects were 
serving as controls. After completion of the second half of the pretreatment 
phase, all subjects were given the third, and final, administration of the 
MAACL (MAAC1.3) and were read the following instructions: 
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This is that same questionnaire you filled out earlier. Again, your 
answers may or may not be the same as they were before-that is not 
important. The important thing is to check off all those adjectives that 
describe how you are feeling right now-at this yex:y moment. Please 
read the words carefully, work rapidly, and tell me when you are 
through. 
Block 3 
The pretreatment phase (Blocks 1 and 2) was designed to induce 
helplessness in Group B subjects and the test phase (Block 3) was designed to 
measure the generalization effects of this helplessness induction on a 
different task. In Block 3, the following instructions were read to all subjects: 
Please listen to these instructions carefully. These are different than the 
earlier set of instructions. I am not allowed to give you additional 
information other than what I am about to tell you. I will answer any 
questions that you may have at the end of the experiment. You will be 
given some trials in which a slightly unpleasant noise will be 
presented to you. Whenever you hear the noise come on there is 
something you can do to stop it. If you are unable to figure out the 
strategy, the noise will stop on its own after 5 seconds. The goal is to do 
something in order to keep the noise off as much as possible. You will 
not receive feedback on whether you are keeping the noise off or 
whether the noise is turning off automatically, but this should become 
obvious to you as you do the task. I'll give you two hints that might 
help you. First, use only t.h.e colored keys exposed on t.h.e keyboard. I'll 
show you those in just a second-they're under the cover right now. 
Second, it might help to occasionally look up at the screen while 
making a response to see the effect your response is having. Do you 
understand these instructions? [Again], taking the headphones off, 
dismantling the apparatus, and removing the keyboard cover will not 
help you stop the noise so please don't do those things. I'll answer any 
questions at the very end of the experiment. I'll be next door and I'll 
return when this part of the experiment is over. 
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A different reminder printed on a sheet of paper was posted below the 
computer monitor and read: "You are to figure out a strategy that will keep 
the noise off as much as possible: Hint Use the marked keys in some way 
and, it may help to occasionally look up at the screen to see the effect your 
response is having." 
A second Expectancy Rating Form (ER2) was administered at this point. 
Again, the experimenter asked the subject to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how 
well she thought she was going to do on the upcoming task (0 = Poorly; 10 = 
Very Well). 
As in Blocks 1 and 2, during Block 3 all subjects were administered a 
series of 25 self-selected tones. Again, the intertrial interval duration was 
predetermined and the same for all subjects. During Block 3, it was possible 
for all subjects, regardless of triadic group assignment, to figure out the 
strategy on the test phase task. At the beginning of each of the 25 trials, a 
graphically-presented shuttlebox appeared on the computer monitor. A 
cursor was preset in the left box. Once the tone came on, subjects could 
terminate the tone by moving the cursor from the left box, through an 
"alley", to the right box by pressing the top red key and right blue key (located 
on the number pad) in an alternating fashion. In order to move from the 
right box to the left box, subjects were required to press the top red key and left 
blue key in an alternating fashion. The initial cursor placement, and hence, 
correct response sequence alternated each trial. After the tone sounded, if a 
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subject was unable to move the cursor across the screen in five seconds, the 
tone stopped automatically. Five seconds prior to the onset of each tone, a 
"warning signal" appeared on the screen and was present until the tone 
sounded. Subjects were able to move the cursor as soon as the warning signal 
appeared and, if they responded quickly enough, could get to the opposite box 
prior to the tone ever sounding. Thus, t."ley could avoid the noise altogether. 
To escape the tone was defined as terminating the noise within 5 seconds 
after it had sounded, and to avoid the noise was defined as making a correct 
response prior to tone onset. 
Upon completion of the test phase, all subjects were administered a 
Post-Experiment questionnaire and underwent a formal debriefing (Appendix 
H). The DACL was administered for ethical purposes to identify subjects who 
might have been distressed as a result of the procedure, but were not willing 
to admit this to the experimenter when specifically asked. Two subjects were 
administered Special Debriefing B (Appendix G) as a precautionary measure 
to address suspected distress. However, these two subjects reported that they 
were upset due to reasons unrelated to their participation in the experiment. 
After the debriefing, all subjects a) were asked for permission to use the 
data collected, b) were asked not to tell anyone about the details of the 
experiment so as to insure that future subjects would be naive, c) were either 
given research credit or financial compensation for their participation, and d) 
were thanked for their time and contribution. 
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Independent Variables 
The primary independent variables used in the present study were 
diagnostic group and triadic design group. Diagnostic group was comprised of 
three levels (i.e., OCPD, AFC, and NC), as was triadic design group (i.e., Group 
A, Group B, and Group C). Crossing the two primary factors yielded a 3 by 3 
factorial design. A secondary independent variable was created by converting 
the ASQ Composite (defined below) into a two-category variable so that it 
could be used as a factor. The two categories were ASQ Composite scores 
above the mean, and ASQ Composite scores below the mean. 
Primary Dependent Variables 
The following section operationally defines the primary dependent 
variables utilized in the study and indicates what high and/ or low scores on 
various measures represent. It is meant to be used as convenient reference. 
Expectancy Ratings 
ER1-ER2-This variable represents the change in performance expectancy 
from the pretreatment task to the test phase task. Higher numbers suggest the 
perception of uncontrollability and reduced confidence. 
Learned Helplessness Deficits/Disruptions 
Mfective Disruptions (MAACL) 
MAACL Composite-This variable represents the change in overall affect 
from baseline to the end of the pretreatment phase. Higher scores represent 
an increase in overall affect. 
D3-Dl-This variable represents the change in depressive affect from baseline 
to the end of the pretreatment phase. Higher scores represent an increase in 
depressive affect. 
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A3-Al-This variable represents the change in anxious affect from baseline to 
the end of the pretreatment phase. Higher scores represent an increase in 
anxious affect. 
H3-Hl-This variable represents the change in hostile affect from baseline to 
the end of the pretreatment phase. Higher scores represent an increase in 
hostile affect. 
Cognitive/Motivational Deficits (Shuttlebox Measures) 
Number of Trials to Criterion-Escape Response (NTC-Escape)-This variable is 
operationally defined as the number of trials (out of 25) needed to meet the 
escape response learning criterion (3 consecutive escape responses). Lower 
scores represent quicker learning and presumably less depression. 
Number of Failures (NF)-This variable is operationally defined as the 
number of trials (out of 25) on which the subject fails to make an escape 
response. Lower scores represent quicker learning, greater motivation, and 
presumably less depression. 
Latency 
a. Reaction Time on Triall (RTl)-This variable is operationally 
defined as the latency (in seconds) for the subject to initiate a key press 
on Triall. Lower scores represent greater motivation and presumably 
less depression. 
b. Mean Latency to Initiate a Response (MLI)-This variable is 
operationally defined as the mean latency to initiate a response (in 
seconds) over 25 trials for the subject to initiate a key press. Lower 
scores represent gr~~ter motivation and presumably less depression. 
Number of Trials to Criterion-Avoid Response (NTC-Avoid)-This variable is 
operationally defined as the number of trials (out of 25) needed to meet the 
avoidance response criterion (3 consecutive avoidance responses). Lower 
scores represent quicker learning and presumably less depression. 
Number of Avoidance Responses (NA)-This variable is operationally 
defined as the number of trials (out of 25) on which a subject successfully 
makes an avoidance response. Higher scores represent quicker learning, 
greater motivation, and presumably less depression. 
Trait Measures 
Attributional Style Questionnaire 
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ASQ Negative Events-According to the literature this is the most predictive 
index of the Attributional style Questionnaire scales. Higher scores represent 
a more depressive attributional style when faced with negative events. 
ASQ Positive Events-Lower scores represent a more depressive attributional 
style when faced with positive events. 
ASQ Composite--ASQ-Negative Events minus ASQ-Positive Events. Higher 
scores represent a more depressive attributional style when faced with both 
positive and negative events. 
ASQ Subscales-selected subscales will be addressed and defined later in the 
text. 
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale 
TSCS Total Positive--This score represents overall self-esteem. Higher scores 
indicate higher self-esteem. 
Mood Progression 
Percent Change in Depression in Block 1 from MAACL1 to MAACL2 
Percent Change in Anxiety in Block 1 from MAACL1 to MAACL2 
Percent Change in Depression in Block 2 from ~.1l·.ACL2 to MAACL3 





The findings of the present study are presented under seven 
subheadings. In the first section, expectancy ratings are analysed to satisfy the 
prerequisite for demonstrating the learned helplessness effect; namely, it 
must be established that Triadic Group B subjects "perceive uncontrollability" 
in the pretreatment phase. In the second section, the overall helplessness 
construct is assessed using multivariate analyses with special attention being 
paid to the role of personality and attributional style influences on the basic 
learned helplessness effect. In the third section, the component deficits and 
disruptions comprising this overall construct, as well as the impact of 
personality characteristics on helplessness induction, are analysed using 
univariate statistics. In the fourth section, diagnostic groups are compared on 
attributional style and self-esteem trait measures, using univariate analyses, 
and these two measures are correlated using Pearson's product moment 
correlation coefficient. In the fifth section, descriptive and inferential statistics 
are utilized in an attempt to assess the hypothesized learned helplessness 
mood progression. In the sixth section, post-experiment questionnaire 
ratings, designed to clarify predicted and unpredicted results, are analyzed 
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using univariate methods. And finally, in the seventh section, ancillary 
analyses which are used to illustrate the arguments made in the discussion 
section are presented. 
Expectancy Ratings 
It was predicted that Group B subjects would perceive uncontrollability 
and report being less confident about their future performance on a different 
task to which they had not yet been exposed. A two-way ANOV A on change 
in expectancy ratings (ER1-ER2) was performed with triadic group and 
diagnostic group serving as factors. This analysis yielded a statistically 
significant triadic group effect, E (2,125) = 24.69, l2 = .0001. Triadic group means 
were as follows: Group A = -.17, Group C = .49, Group B = 1.64 (Table 2). 
According to Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons, all three groups were 
significantly different from one another {Table 3). Thus, Group B 
demonstrated less confidence and greater perceived uncontrollability than 
both Group A and Group Cas predicted. Interestingly, an unpredicted finding 
was that Group C demonstrated less confidence and greater perceived 
uncontrollability than Group A. No significant diagnostic effect or interaction 
was obtained. 
Multivariate Analyses 
Several multivariate analyses were performed to assess the effects of 
the independent variables on combined dependent variables. These global 
tests address a larger "helplessness" construct (i.e., the overall learned 
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helplessness effect), whereas the more molecular analyses, to be covered 
below, address the component deficits/disruptions in isolation. Interestingly, 
past learned helplessness research has often inspected only the individual 
variables, some which have yielded statistical significance and some which 
have not, in determining whether a basic effect has been obtained. Such a 
determination, at times, has been quite subjective in that researchers have 
argued for obtaining the effect based on an arbitrary number of the analyses 
yielding significant differences. The advantage of the MANOV A is that it 
addresses such a determination statistically, taking into account the 
correlation among the various dependent variables included in the model. 
In the present study, it was predicted that Group B subjects would 
demonstrate greater learned helplessness deficits than Group A and C 
counterparts and that OCPD would be more vulnerable to helplessness 
induction than AFC and NC. Furthermore, it was predicted that adding ASQ 
to the model, modified as a categorical factor, would demonstrate that 
attributional style does, in fact, influence helplessness induction. Specifically, 
it was predicted that subjects identified as having attributional styles "at-risk" 
for depression would demonstrate more pronounced learned helplessness 
deficits/ disruptions in the experimental demonstration than subjects with 
nondepressive attributional styles. 
a. MANOV A #1: A two-way MANOVA with diagnostic group and 
triadic group as factors yielded a significant triadic group main effect, Wilks' 
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Lambda = .832, equivalent toE (6, 244) = 3.915,12 = .0009 (Table 4) when the 
combined contribution of three dependent variables representing each of the 
traditional learned helplessness deficits was analyzed (i.e., MAACL 
Composite-Affective Disruption; NTC-Escape-Cognitive/Learning Deficit; 
RT1-Motivational/Performance Deficit). An inspection of the means 
indicated that Group C demonstrated greater learned helplessness 
deficits/ disruptions than Group A. However, the statistical significance of the 
difference between Group A and B could not be determined using this model, 
but is addressed using a modified model that is described below. No 
significant diagnostic main effect or interaction was found in MANOV A#l. 
The three dependent variables named above were selected for this MANOV A 
for the following reasons. MAACL-Composite was selected to represent the 
affective domain in this analysis because it is a global measure of affect. While 
learned helplessness is a theory of "depression," research argues that 
perceived uncontrollability produces anxiety, hostility, and depression, all of 
which are assessed by MAACL-Composite (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 
1993). The dependent variables, NTC-Escape and RT1, were identified as the 
best representatives of the cognitive and performance/motivational deficits, 
respectively, in that conceptually, they are the purest measures of their 
respective domains. NTC-Escape has been used as a measure of "ability to 
learn" in many previous studies including Hiroto's (1974) and Hiroto's and 
Seligman's (1975) studies. RT1, or reaction time to initiate a response on Trial 
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1, was selected in this study because it appeared to be the purest measure of 
motivation. The other reaction time measure assessed in this study, MU, is 
an average of latencies over 25 trials. Measures similar to MU have been used 
in previous research (Hiroto, 1974; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975); however, this 
measure of "motivation" appears to be influenced greatly by "ability to learn." 
For example, an individual may be highly motivated, but because she does 
not learn the response requirement as quickly as other subjects, her long MLI 
reaction time may be misleading. Conversely, an individual who learns the 
response requirement quickly and learns that responding prior to the tone is 
possible, may actually be quite unmotivated, and yet, may generate a MLI that 
suggests that she is highly motivated. Therefore, RT1 was selected as the 
representative measure of motivation because it is independent of learning 
the response criterion. 
b. MANOVA #2: Another MANOVA was employed to determine if 
there was a significant difference between the two critical triadic groups, 
Group A and Group B. Thus, Group C was eliminated from the analysis. 
Demonstrating such a difference between Group A and B is necessary to argue 
for a basic learned helplessness effect. In addition to the modified triadic 
group factor, a categorized ASQ factor was added to the model to determine if 
triadic group differences are affected by attributional style. Because no 
significant diagnostic effect or triadic/ diagnostic interaction was obtained in 
MANOV A #1, the diagnostic group factor was removed from the model in 
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MANOVA #2. Therefore, a two-way MANOVA with triadic group and 
categorized ASQ as factors was conducted. This analysis yielded a significant 
triadic group main effect, Wilks' Lambda= .909, equivalent toE (3, 83) = 2.769, 
~ = .0468 (Table 5) when the combined contribution of the three 
representative dependent variables was analyzed. Group B subjects were, 
indeed, found to be more helpless than Group A subjects as predicted, but no 
significant categorized ASQ main effect or interaction was obtained. 
c. MANOVA #3: A third MANOVA was employed as an alternative to 
MANOVA #2. Whereas in MANOVA #2, the cognitive deficit was 
represented by the shuttlebox measure, NTC-Escape; in MANOVA #3, this 
deficit was represented by Expectancy Rating Change over the course of the 
pretreatment (ER1-ER2). Whereas NTC-Escape assessed the actual learning 
curve, ER1-ER2 assessed "belief that actions would not lead to success." The 
independent variables in MANOVA #3 were the same as in MANOVA #2. 
Tnus, a two-way MANOV A, with triadic group and categorized ASQ as 
factors, was conducted. This analysis yielded a significant triadic group main 
effect, Wilks' Lambda = .577, equivalent to .E (3,83) = 20.281, ~ = .0001 (Table 6) 
when the combined contribution of the three representative dependent 
variables was analyzed. Again, Group B subjects were found to be more 
helpless than Group A subjects, and no significant categorized ASQ main 
effect or interaction was obtained. Here, in MANOVA #3, the cognitive deficit 
was defined more as an "irrational expectancy" as opposed to a "slowed ability 
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to learn." In the learned helplessness literature, it has been defined both ways. 
In the present study, ER1-ER2 was designed pri..marily as a measure to assess 
perceived uncontrollability in the pretreatment. But, given that it explicitly 
assesses expectancy of test phase performance, using it as an "irrational 
cognition" measure in this model appears justified. If Group B subjects make 
a pessimistic judgement on their upcoming performance without being 
exposed to the actual contingencies, such a judgement might be considered a 
cognitive deficit. Modifying the model in this way actually produced a more 
robust basic effect, again confirming the hypothesis. But, again, attributional 
style did not appear to effect performance. 
The conclusions drawn from the MANOV A findings are that (a) the 
basic learned helplessness effect was demonstrated, thus confirming the 
hypothesis, but that (b) personality features and attributional style did not 
influence this induction differentially as was predicted. An interesting 
finding was the presentation of "helplessness" symptoms in triadic Group C 
subjects-a finding that is addressed in greater detail later in the text. 
Learned Helplessness Deficits /Disruptions 
While several MANOV As were employed to assess the overall learned 
helplessness effect, separate analyses were performed to pinpoint which of the 
representative dependent variables were predominately responsible for the 
MANOV A findings. L11 addition, other variables from the three 
deficit/disruption domains were analysed, and these analyses are presented 
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below. 
Several two-way ANOV As with triadic group and diagnostic group as 
factors were performed to assess the learned helplessness effects of perceived 
uncontrollability (i.e., affective disruptions, cognitive deficits, 
performance/motivational deficits). It was predicted that Group B subjects 
would demonstrate greater learned helplessness than Group A and C 
counterparts, and that OCPD would be more vulnerable to helplessness 
induction than AFC and NC. 
Affective Disruptions 
With regard to the overall affect change score on the MAACL (MAACL-
Composite), a significant triadic group main effect was obtained, E (2,126) = 
4.30, ,R = .0156 (Table 7). Triadic group means were as follows: Group A = 5.83, 
Group C = 11.4, Group B = 13.21. Group A and B were significantly different 
from one another based on Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons (Table 8), 
and Group A and C were significantly different from one another based on a 
more liberal Fisher's PLSD test of multiple comparisons (Table 8). Group B 
and C were more distressed overall than Group A but were not statistically 
different from one another. No significant diagnostic main effect or 
interaction was obtained. The diagnostic group means of Group B subjects 
follow: OCPD = 9.57, NC = 14.6, AFC = 15.36. 
With regard to the depression change score on the MAACL (D3-D1), a 
significant triadic group main effect was obtained, E (2,127) = 3.60, ~ = .03 
79 
(Table 7). Triadic group means were as follows: Group A = 2.13, Group C = 
4.31, Group B = 5.18. Only Groups A and B were significantly different from 
one another based on Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons (Table 8). Group 
B was more depressed than Group A. No significant diagnostic main effect or 
interaction was obtained. The diagnostic group means of Group B subjects 
follow: OCPD = 3.53, NC = 6.0, AFC = 6.07. 
With regard to the anxiety change score on the MAACL (A3-A1), the F 
value approached statistical significance, E (2,127) = 2.97, 12 = .055 (Table 7). 
Triadic group means were as follows: Group A = 1.74, Group C = 3.11, Group B 
= 3.45. A significant triadic group effect was obtained, however, when the 
model used only triadic group as a factor, E (2,133) = 3.08, 12 = .0495. Only 
Groups A and B were significantly different from one another based on 
Fisher's PLSD test of multiple comparisons (Table 8). Group B was more 
anxious than Group A. No significant diagnostic main effect or interaction 
was obtained using the two-way ANOVA. The diagnostic group means of 
Group B subjects follow: OCPD = 2.93, AFC = 3.64, NC = 3.80. 
With regard to the hostility change score on the MAACL (H3-H1), a 
significant triadic group main effect was obtained, E (2,127) = 4.16, 12 = .0178 
(Table 7). Triadic group means were as follows: Group A= 1.96, Group C = 
3.98, Group B = 4.43. Group A and B were significantly different from one 
another based on Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons (Table 8), and Group 
A and C were significantly different from one another based on Fisher's PLSD 
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test of multiple comparisons {Table 8). Group B and C were more hostile than 
Group A. No significant diagnostic main effect or interaction was obtained. 
The diagnostic group means of Group B subjects follow: OCPD = 2.93, NC = 
4.8, AFC = 5.64. 
The above findings confirm the hypothesis that perceived 
uncontrollability produces affective disruptions, and thus, they support the 
basic learned helplessness effect. Interestingly, Group C subjects became quite 
distressed simply listening to the tones, however, less so than Group B. The 
prediction that OCPD Group B subjects would become relatively more 
distressed was not confirmed. However, an interesting diagnostic finding was 
that, within AFC, the percent change in anxiety for Group A subjects (M = 
42% increase) was statistically greater than the percent change in anxiety for 
Group B subjects (M = 2% decrease) during the second half of the 
pretreatment using Fisher's PLSD test of multiple comparison, E (2, 42) = 
2.211, ll = .1222 (Table 9 for ANOVA and Table 10 for test of multiple 
comparison). Such a finding was not noted when the other two diagnostic 
groups were analyzed separately. This interesting finding is addressed in 
greater detail later in the text. 
Cognitive and Performance/Motivational Deficits 
SHUITLEBOX MEASURES 
With regard to NTC-Escape, a significant triadic group effect was 
obtained, E (2,127) = 5.35, 12 = .0059 (Table 11). Triadic group means were as 
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follows: Group A = 11.45, Group B = 12.07, Group C = 15.98. Accordh1g to 
Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons, Group C was significantly different 
(i.e., slower to learn) than both Group A and B, but Group A and B, despite 
being in the predicted direction, were not significantly different from one 
another (Table 12). No significant diagnostic main effect or interaction was 
obtained. The diagnostic group means of Group B subjects follow: AFC = 
10.79, OCPD = 12.0, NC = 13.33. Interestingly, when the model was modified by 
excluding OCPD subjects, a significant interaction was obtained, E (2,85) = 
3.319, ~ = .034 (Table 11). An inspection of the means reveals that, NC Group 
B subjects (M = 13.333), as predicted, and NC Group C subjects (M = 18.133) 
take longer to learn the criterion than their NC Group A counterparts (M = 
9.188). However, the opposite is the case with regard to AFC. AFC Group A 
subjects actually take longer (M = 14.188) than their Group B (M = 10.786) and 
Group C (M = 13.867) counterparts. Thus, personality fa~.:tors appear to interact 
with helplessness induction on this measure, albeit not in a manner 
predicted. 
With regard to NF, a significant triadic group effect was obtained, E 
(2,126) = 5.39, ~ = .0057 (Table 11). Triadic group means were as follows: Group 
A = 8.6, Group B = 9.47, Group C = 13.53. According to Scheffe's test of 
multiple comparisons, Group C was significantly different (i.e., more failures) 
than both Group A and B, but, despite being in the predicted direction, Group 
A and B means were not significantly different from one another (Table 12). 
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No significant diagnostic main effect or interaction was obtained. The 
diagnostic group means of Group B subjects follow: AFC = 8.54, OCPD = 9.73, 
NC = 10.0. Interesti.."'l.gly, when the model was modified by excluding OCPD 
subjects, the interaction approached statistical significance, E. (2,84) = 2,513, ~ = 
.0871 {Table 11). An inspection of the means reveals that, NC Group B subjects 
(M = 10.00), as predicted, and NC Group C subjects (M = 15.667) fail more 
trials than their NC Group A counterparts (M = 6.5). However, with regard to 
the AFC Group A and Group B means, the opposite is true. AFC Group A 
subjects actually fail more trials (M = 11.00) than their Group B (M = 8.538) 
counterparts. 
With regard to RTl, a significant triadic group effect was obtained, E 
{2,125) = 4.95, ~ = .0085 {Table 11). Triadic group means were as follows: Group 
A = 4.93, Group B = 5.2; Group C = 6.16. Group C was significantly different 
(i.e., slower reaction time) than Group A usbg Scheffe's test of multiple 
comparisons {Table 12) and significantly different than Group Busing 
Fisher's PLSD test of multiple comparisons {Table 12). Group A and B were 
not statistically different from one another, but means were in the prediction 
direction. No significant diagnostic main effect or interaction was obtained. 
The diagnostic group means of Group B subjects follow: AFC = 4.43, OCPD = 
5.25, NC = 5.81. Again, when the model was modified by excluding OCPD 
subjects, the interaction approached statistical significance, E (2,83) = 2.188, I2 = 
.1186 {Table 11). An inspection of the means reveals that, NC Group B 
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subjects' (M = 5.814 sec.), as predicted, and NC Group C subjects' (M = 5.901 
sec.) reaction times are slower than their NC Group A counterparts (M = 4.946 
sec.). However, with regard to the AFC Group A and Group B means, the 
opposite is true. AFC Group A subjects' reaction times are actually slower (M 
= 5.324 sec.) than their Group B (M = 4.431 sec.) counterparts. 
With regard to MU, no significant triadic group main effect, diagnostic 
main effect, or interaction was obtained (Table 11 ). Triadic group means were 
as follows: Group C = 3.69 sec., Group A = 4.3 sec., Group B = 4.32 sec .. The 
diagnostic group means of Group B subjects follow: NC = 4.1 sec., AFC = 4.26 
sec., OCPD = 4.59 sec .. 
With regard to NTC-Avoid, no significant triadic group main effect, 
diagnostic main effect, or interaction was obtained (Table 11). Triadic group 
means were as follows: Group C = 20.56, Group B = 20.95, Group C = 21.77. The 
diagnostic group means of Group B subjects follow: AFC = 19.64, NC = 21.0, 
OCPD = 22.13. 
With regard to NA, no significant triadic group main effect, diagnostic 
main effect, or interaction was obtained (Table 11). Triadic group means were 
as follows: Group A = 4.36, Group B = 4.81, Group C = 5.71. The diagnostic 
group means of Group B subjects follow: OCPD = 3.47, NC = 5.53, AFC = 5.54. 
While the MANOV A results confirmed the learned helplessness basic 
effect by assessing the deficit/ disruption domains collectively, the above 
shuttlebox measures, taken separately, yielded mixed results. Nevertheless, 
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upon inspection of the representative measures, NTC-Escape and RTl, a 
trend in the predicted direction was noted with Group B subjects 
demonstrating greater cognitive and performance/motivational deficits than 
Group A subjects. Such a trend is worthy of note given that it does, in fact, 
contribute to the significant MANOVA findings. Interestingly, however, 
Group C subjects performed in a manner significantly more "helpless" than 
either Group A orB on NTC-Escape, NF, and RTl. This finding was not 
predicted, but is intriguing and is addressed later in the text. The hypothesis of 
an OCPD vulnerability was not confirmed. However, an interesting 
diagnostic finding was that, while Group A and Group B NC subjects 
performed in the predicted direction on NTC-Escape, Group A and Group B 
AFC subjects performed in the QPposite direction as was evidenced by a 
significant interaction {Table 11). A similar pattern of results was obtained on 
NF and RTl; however, on these measures the interactions only approached 
statistical significance. This interesting finding is discussed later in the text as 
well. 
Recall from above, ER1-ER2 was also used as a cognitive deficit 
measure in MANOV A #3. Thus, the statistically significant expectancy rating 
finding noted above (Table 2) also supports the basic learned helplessness 
effect. An argument can be made that ER1-ER2 also might be used to 
represent a "self-esteem deficit." Recall that in the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory, in addition to the three traditional deficits/ disruptions, a 
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fourth deficit-self-esteem-was added. While this is not always directly 
assessed in learned helplessness research, "lowered expectancy" in Group B 
subjects might be interpreted as a "lowered confidence in ability," thus adding 
further support to the basic effect. Note that self-esteem as measured by ER1-
ER2 is a "state" measure subject to situational changes, whereas self-esteem 
assessed by the TSCS is a "trait" measure. 
Irait Measures 
Several two-way ANOVAs with triadic group and diagnostic group as 
factors were performed to detect any significant diagnostic, triadic, or 
interactive effects on the ASQ and TSCS. It was predicted that the personality 
disorder analogue groups, particularly OCPD, would self-report more 
depressive attributional styles. It was also predicted that AFC would 
demonstrate poor self-esteem relative to NC, but no specific hypothesis was 
made with regard to OCPD's self-esteem. It was predicted that no triadic effects 
or interactions would be obtained given that these are trait measures 
administered prior to the experimental treatment. 
Attributional Style Questionnaire 
With regard to ASQ-Negative Events, a significant diagnostic effect 
was obtained, E (2,127) = 9.18, ~ = .0002 (Table 13). Group means were as 
follows: NC = 3.75, OCPD = 4.1, AFC = 4.2. Both OCPD and AFC were 
statistically different, and thus, more "at-risk" for depression than NC, but 
were not statistically different from one another using Scheffe's test of 
multiple comparisons (Table 14). No significant triadic group effect or 
interaction was obtained. 
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With regard to ASQ-Positive Events, a significant diagnostic effect was 
obtained, E {2,127) = 6.09,12 = .003 (Table 13). Group means were as follows: 
AFC = 5.06, OCPD = 5.35, NC = 5.47. AFC was statistically different, and more 
"at-risk" for depression, than NC using Scheffe's test of multiple comparison 
(Table 14), and AFC was statistically different, and more "at-risk" for 
depression than OCPD, using Fisher's PLSD test of multiple comparisons 
(Table 14). OCPD and NC were not statistically different from one another 
based on either test of multiple comparisons. No significant triadic group 
effect or interaction was obtained. 
With regard to ASQ--composite, a significant diagnostic effect was 
obtained, E {2,127) = 12.47, 12 = .0001 (Table 13). Group means were as follows: 
NC = -1.72, OCPD = -1.25, AFC = -.85. These means are derived by subtracting 
the ASQ-Positive score from the ASQ-Negative score. These means are less 
than zero because, for all three diagnostic groups, the ASQ-Positive Events 
mean was greater than the ASQ-Negative Events mean. With regard to ASQ-
Composite, OCPD and AFC were statistically different, and more "at-risk" for 
depression, than NC, but not statistically different from one another using 
Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons (Table 14). They were statistically 
different from one another, however, using the more liberal Fisher's PLSD 
test of multiple comparisons {Table 14). Using this comparison, AFC was 
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more "at-risk" for depression than OCPD. No significant triadic group effect 
or interaction was obtained. 
Inspection of the ASQ subscales revealed the following significant 
comparisons: (a) AFC was determined to attribute more internal reasons to 
negative events, E {2,127) = 5.26, J2 = .0064 (Table 15 for ANOVA and Table 16 
for test of multiple comparisons) and to be more unstable with regard to their 
attributions for positive events, .f {2,127) = 4.57, J2 = .0121 (Table 15 for 
ANOVA and Table 16 for test of multiple comparisons) than both NC and 
OCPD, (b) OCPD's attributions were determined to be more global than NC 
with respect to achievement events regardless of whether the event was 
positive or negative, E {2,127) = 2.77, J2 = .0662 {Table 15 for ANOV A and Table 
16 for test of multiple comparisons), and (c) personality analogues (i.e., OCPD, 
AFC) were determined to make more external attributions for positive 
events, E (2,127) =7.16, 1:! = .0011 {Table 15 for ANOVA and Table 16 for test of 
multiple comparisons) and more global attributions for negative events than 
NC, E (2,127) = 6.72, J2 = .0017 (Table 15 for ANOV A and Table 16 for test of 
multiple comparisons). No significant triadic group effects or interactions 
were obtained on any of the subtest analyses highlighted above. 
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale 
With regard to TSCS-Total Positive, a significant diagnostic effect was 
obtained, E (2,126) = 10.161,}2 = .0001 {Table 17). Diagnostic group means were 
as follows: NC = 367.22, OCPD = 364.80, AFC = 343.89. AFC was determined to 
88 
be statistically different (i.e., possessing lower self-esteem) than NC and OCPD 
using Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons (Table 18). No significant triadic 
group effect or interaction was obtained. 
Consistent with past research, a significant Pearson's product moment 
correlation coefficient was obtained when ASQ-Composite was correlated 
with TSC5-Total Positive, r (136) = -.461, ~ < .001). This indicates that at-risk 
attributional styles are associated with low self-esteem. 
Overall, the trait results suggest that the two analogue groups, as 
predicted, are more susceptible to a learned helplessness depression based on 
ASQ, but that OCPD are no more "at-risk" for depression than AFC as was 
hypothesized. In fact, with regard to ASQ-Composite, AFC are significantly 
more vulnerable than OCPD using the liberal Fisher's PLSD test of multiple 
comparisons. As was mentioned above, however, neither diagnosis nor 
attributional style predicted actual performance during the two-phase 
helplessness procedure. Also, AFC subjects were found to have lower self-
esteem than NC, as predicted, and lower self-esteem than OCPD. 
Mood Progression 
Recall, it was predicted that, within Group B subjects, a mood 
progression from perceived uncontrollability to anxiety to depression would 
be noted. This progression would serve as an experimental microcosm of the 
mood progression that is purported to occur in the development of a learned 
helplessness depression. 
During the first half of the pretreatment phase (Block 1}, Group B 
subjects' anxiety affect increased 75% as compared to a 48% increase in 
depression affect (i.e., Change in Anxiety: M A2 - M A1/ A1 M; Change in 
Depression: M D2-M Dl/ 
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M 01). During the second half of the pretreatment phase (Block 2}, Group B 
subjects' anxiety affect increased 4% as compared to a 7% increase in 
depression affect. 
Note that most affect change took place in Block 1. Nevertheless, 
anxiety increased more than depression in Block 1, and depression increased 
more than anxiety in Block 2. Despite these descriptive statistics, the percent 
increase in anxiety relative to depression in Block 1 and the percent increase 
in depression relative to anxiety in Block 2 was not statistically significant 
when paired t-tests were used; Block 1:1 (43) = .376,12 = .3543 (one-tailed}, 
Depression M = 159%, Anxiety M = 177%; Block 2:1 (43) = .518,12 = .3035 (one-
tailed}, Depression M = 7%, Anxiety M = 11%. Note, in fact, that the means in 
Block 2 are opposite of the descriptive statistics and predictions (i.e., in Block 
2, Group B subjects became relatively more anxious than depressed although 
this difference was not statistically significant). 
Given that Group C reported significant subjective distress during the 
pretreatment relative to Group A subjects, their mood progression was also 
investigated. An inspection of the means revealed that, like Group B subjects, 
Group C subjects' anxiety increased more during Block 1 relative to their 
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depression, and, consistent with predictions, their depression increased more 
during Block 2 relative to their anxiety. Again, neither t-test used to make the 
comparision yielded a statistically significant difference; however, the 
anxiety I depression difference during Block 1 approached statistical 
significance, Block 1: 1 (44) = 1.555, l1 = .0636 (one-tailed), Depression M= 73%, 
Anxiety M= 113%; Block 2: 1 (44) = -.473, ;R = .3193 (one-tailed), Depression M = 
28%, Anxiety M = 23%. 
Hence, while an inspection of the means suggested that anxiety 
increased more than depression in Block 1 for both Group Band Group C, 
Group C data were more consistent with the overall directional predictions of 
the mood progression hypothesis. Overall, the above findings provide 
modest support for the mood progression hypothesis. 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire Analyses 
A debriefing questionnaire was administered to tap certain exploratory 
"process" variables that were hoped would clarify predicted and unpredicted 
results. One question asked was, "in the first part of the experiment, what 
strategy did you use to turn off the noise?" It was clear based on informal 
inspection of the verbal reports of Group A subjects that they had, in fact, 
discovered the required pattern of key presses responsible for terminating the 
noise. Group B subjects reported that they had attempted many strategies, but 
had failed to discover the correct one. 
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Another question asked was "how confident are you that your strategy 
stopped the noise in the first part of the experiment?" Subjects were asked to 
rate their response on a scale from 0 (not confident at all) to 10 (very 
confident). A two-way ANOV A with triadic group and diagnostic group as 
factors yielded a significant triadic group effect, E (1,85) = 340.89, ;R = .0001 
{Table 19a). No significant diagnostic effect or interaction was obtained. Group 
A subjects (M. = 8.72) produced significantly higher confidence ratings than 
Group B subjects (M = 1.13), lending further support to the hypothesis that 
Group B subjects would perceive uncontrollability. Gxoup C subjects were not 
administered the pretreatment task, and thus, were not asked to rate the 
above question. 
Subjects were also asked to rate the unpleasantness of the tone during 
the first part of the experiment (i.e., Block 1 and 2) on a scale from 0 (not 
unpleasant at all) to 10 (extremely unpleasant). A two-way ANOVA with 
triadic group and diagnostic group as factors yielded no significant triadic 
group effect, diagnostic group effect, or interaction (Table 19b ). Triadic group 
means were the following: Group A=5.29, Group B=5.09, C=5.16. Diagnostic 
group means were the following: OCPD=4.80, AFC=5.47, NC=5.28). Therefore, 
subjects' subjective experience of the tone during the pretreatment phase was 
not significantly influenced by their triadic group or diagnostic group 
assignment. It also should be mentioned that no triadic group effect, 
diagnostic group effect, or interaction was found using a two-way ANOV A to 
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analyze actual decibel level selection of subjects (Table 19c). 
Also, with regard to the pretreatment phase, two-way ANOV As with 
triadic group and diagnostic group as factors were conducted on ratings (i.e., 0 
to 10) of the following post-experiment questions: 1) "how important was it 
for you to figure out the strategy?," 2) "how hard did you try to stop the 
noise?" and 3) "how well would you expect to do if you were asked to do the 
same task again?" Group A subjects rated their pretreatment performance as 
more important than Group B subjects, E (1,84) = 23.28, ~ = .0001; Group A M 
= 7.59; Group B M = 5.33 {Table 19d). And Group A reported that they thought 
they would do better on the task compared to Group B subjects were it to start 
up again, E (1,84) = 254.00, ~ = .0001; Group AM= 8.96; Group B .M = 2.54 
(Table 19e). No triadic group effect was found on the question regarding effort 
(Table 19£). And no diagnostic group effect or interaction was noted on any of 
the above ratings. 
Identical questions were asked in regard to subjects' performance on 
the test phase task. Given that Group C subjects were administered the same 
test phase task, they were asked to rate the following questions as well. No 
diagnostic or triadic group differences were noted with regard to confidence in 
strategy ratings {Table 20a), effort ratings {Table 20b ), or expectancy ratings 
(Table 20c). However, Gioup B subjects judged the tone to be less aversive 
than Group A subjects using Fisher's PLSD test of multiple comparisons, .E 
(2,133) = 2.37,p. = .09; Group AM = 5.77; Group B M = 4.636, Group C M = 5.07 
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(Table 20d for ANOVA and Table 21 for test of multiple comparisons). Also, 
Group A subjects rated their performance as more important relative to 
Group B subjects, using Fisher's PLSD test of multiple comparisons, E. (2,132) 
= 2.55, J2 = .08; Group AM = 7.76; Group B M = 6.77 (See Table 20e for ANOV A 
and Table 21 for test of multiple comparisons). 
In addition, two-way ANOV As with triadic group and diagnostic group 
as factors were conducted on ratings of subjects' attributions for Block 3 
failures: (a) lack of ability (Table 20£), lack of effort (Table 20g), or the 
impossibility of the task {Table 20h). Furthermore, two-way ANOV As were 
conducted on the ratings of the following questions: "how well did you think 
you would be able to stop the noise when you first saw the shuttlebox appear 
on the screen?" (Table 20i), "how important was it for you to make a good 
impression on the experimenter?" {Table 20j), and "how interesting was the 
entire experiment to you?" (Table 20k). Of these comparisons, only the 
following were statistically significant: Group C demonstrated greater 
confidence than Group B, using Fisher's test of multiple comparisons, with 
regard to being able to stop the noise when first exposed to the shuttlebox, E 
(2,133) = 2.26, ~ = .11; Group AM= 6.00; Group B M = 5.43, Group C M = 6.29 
(Table 20i for ANOV A and Table 21 for test of multiple comparisons). Group 
A was more likely than Group B, using Fisher's test of multiple comparisons, 
to attribute failures to their inability, E (2,124) = 2.689, I2 = .0719; Group AM= 
7.35; Group B M = 6.00, Group C M = 6.93 (Table 20f for ANOV A and Table 21 
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for test of multiple comparisons). AFC subjects were more likely than NC 
subjects, using Fisher's test of multiple comparisons, to attribute their failures 
to their lack of effort, E. (2,126) = 1.966, 12 = .1443; AFC M = 3.82; NC M = 2.69, 
OCPD M = 3.16 (Table 20g for ANOVA and Table 21 for test of multiple 
comparisons). Group A was more likely than Group B, using Fisher's test of 
multiple comparisons, to report that they found the experiment interesting, E. 
(2,127) = 2.323, 12 = .1021; Group AM= 6.79; Group B M = 5.86, Group C M = 
6.36 (Table 20k for ANOVA and Table 21 for test of multiple comparisons). 
Finally, subjects were asked if they knew the specific purpose and hypotheses 
of the study, and if they did, to elaborate. While some subjects offered 
hypotheses that approximated that of the study's, none was specific enough, 
according to an informal inspection of subjects' written responses, to suggest 
that the results were compromised. 
Ancillary Analyses 
The following analyses were conducted post hoc to provide support for 
arguments made in the discussion section. They are presented here without 
elaboration. Their purpose and contribution is clarified later in the text. 
A one-way analysis of variance revealed that OCPD Group B subjects' 
percent increase in depression during Block 2 (M = -1 %) was less than NC 
Group B subjects' percent increase in depression (M = 16 %) using Fisher's 
PLSD test of multiple comparison, E. (2,41) = 2.374, :R = .1058 (Table 22 for 
ANOVA and Table 23 for test of multiple comparisons). 
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A one-way analysis of variance on BDI scores with diagnostic group as 
the factor was statistically significant, E (2,133) = 8.44, 12 = .0004 (Table 24). AFC 
subjects were determined to be significantly more depressed (M = 4.93) than 
NC (M = 2.07) and OCPD (M = 2.69) using Scheffe's test of multiple 
comparisons {Table 25). 
A one-way analysis of variance on ERl with diagnostic group as the 
factor (OCPD excluded from the model) approached statistical significance, E 
(1,89) = 3.743, 12 = .0562 (Table 26). Diagnostic group means follow: AFC M = 
6.222; NC M = 6.848. 
A one-way analysis of variance on MAACL-composite with triadic 
group as the factor (only AFC subjects included) was statistically significant, E 
(2,42) = 3.387, J2 = .0433 (Table 27). AFC Group A subjects were determined to 
be significantly less distressed CM. = 3.938) than AFC Group B subjects (M = 
15.357) using Scheffe's test of multiple comparisons {Table 28). 
A one-way analysis of variance on MAACL-composite during Block 2 
only with triadic group as the factor approached statistical significance, E 
(2,133) = 2.99,12 = .0537 (Table 29). Group C subjects were determined to be 
significantly more distressed (M = 4.93) than Group B counterparts (M = 2.02) 
using Fisher PLSD test of multiple comparison (Table 30). 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Overall Interpretation of the Analyses 
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Consistent with past research, the basic learned helplessness effect was 
demonstrated. Also, OCPD analogues were found to possess a more at-risk 
attributional style based on the ASQ than normal controls, which is 
suggestive of a vulnerability to perceived uncontrollability. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that OCPD might be identified as an at-risk group. 
However, their attributional style was less at-risk for depression than their 
AFC counterparts'. Thus, it can be concluded that the Anxious-Fearful Cluster 
of personality disorders taken collectively (i.e, avoidant, dependent, passive-
aggressive and. obsessive compulsive) are more at-risk for depression than 
normal controls based on their attributional styles. 
Attributional style, however, did not predict behavior in the actual 
experiment. Neither OCPD nor AFC demonstrated greater learned 
helplessness deficits/disruptions than normal controls. OCPD responded 
similarly to NC (i.e., Group B subjects demonstrated deficits/ disruptions 
relative to Group A). However, an interesting and perplexing diagnostic effect 
was that AFC responded in a manner opposite of what is predicted based on 
learned helplessness theory and past research. Another interesting finding 
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was that, Group C, overall, differed significantly from Groups A and B on the 
shuttlebox measures, demonstrating a more pronounced helplessness 
response topography than either of the other triadic groups. This was not 
predicted, but is not altogether unexpected for reasons that will be addressed 
below. While not a central component of the study, modest support for the 
mood progression hypothesis that perceived uncontrollability leads to 
anxiety, which, in turn, results in depression was provided. 
Explanations for Obtained Findings 
Diagnostic Findings: OCPD 
While OCPD and NC Group B subjects became helpless overall, the 
effect was actually~ pronounced among OCPD subjects based on an 
inspection of the means. Interestingly, while NC Group B subjects reported an 
increase in depression from MAACL2 to MAACL3, OCPD Group B subjects 
reported a decrease in depression (Table 22 and 23). This finding, coupled with 
the fact that the differences between OCPD Group A and Group B means on 
NTC-Escape, NF, and RT1 were~ than the differences between NC Group 
A and Group B means on the same measures (Table 31), suggests that 
personality features of OCPD analogues (e.g., goal-orientation, perseverance, 
emotional constriction) actually facilitated shuttlebox performance of OCPD 
Group B subjects relative to NC Group B subjects and served as a "coping 
mechanism" against affective disruption (i.e., depression) in the present 
study. The obtained findings are more consistent with the Thornton (1982) 
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and Wittenborn and Maurer (1977) arguments made earlier which suggested 
that individuals similar to OCPD might be resistent to helplessness induction. 
Perhaps the two hypotheses-QCPD as vulnerable (i.e., as suggested by 
the ASQ findings) versus OCPD as resistant (i.e., as suggested by the 
experimental findings) can be reconciled. Perhaps there exists a linear 
relationship between degree or duration of perceived uncontrollability and 
degree of depression. And perhaps, within OCPD, the manifestation of 
obsessive compulsive behavior varies as a function of the degree and/ or 
duration of perceived uncontrollability. It has been argued that OCPDs engage 
in their c..haracteristic manner to avoid aversiveness. In certain 
environmental contexts (e.g., where the degree of perceived uncontrollability 
is at a minimum or the duration of perceived uncontrollability is short), 
perhaps OC-like behavior is at a minimum. In such an environment, 
depression is not induced and employing such a defense is not adaptive. 
However, in a slightly more "helpless" environment (i.e., greater duration, 
greater degree of perceived uncontrollability), OC-like behavior is utilized, 
and is successful in warding off the possible onset of depression. Such an 
environment may be representative of the present study's environment. In 
yet a more "helpless" environment, it is conceivable that OC-like behavior is 
at a maximum but is unsuccessful in warding off a depression. Here, the 
defense is utilized but is not effective. Finally, in a highly "helpless" 
environment, the OC-like behavior is perhaps extinguished and depression is 
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established. The last scenario appears to be more consistent with the learned 
helplessness conceptualization and the predictions made in the present study. 
Thus, in loose terminology, the environment in force (i.e., which influences 
the degree and/ or duration of perceived uncontrollability) will influence the 
topography of the personality I depression relationship. The present study, of 
course, does not test experimentally this relationship. And, as proposed here, 
such a hypothesis is only speculative. Yet, there is precedence for such 
speculation. 
Pittman and Pittman (1979), in their study which investigated the 
effects of differing degrees of helplessness training and locus of control on 
mood and performance, found that individuals with internal loci of control 
exhibited greater learned helplessness symptoms in high helplessness 
situations (i.e., noncontingent feedback was given for each pretreatment trial) 
than individuals with external loci of control. Furthermore, in~ 
helplessness situations (i.e., no feedback was given on some pretreatment 
trials and noncontingent feedback was given on others), internals performed 
in a ~ helpless manner than controls. Thus, in Pittman and Pittman's 
study, a personality variable-locus of control-and degree of helplessness 
induction interacted with one another. Given that an internal locus of 
control is a defining feature of obsessive compulsive personality disorder, 
Pittman and Pittman's findings are quite applicable to the present study and 
consistent with the relationship proposed above. 
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If such a relationship between OCPD and learned helplessness exists, a 
behavioral account might implicate extinction as the mechanism responsible 
for both "resistance" and "vulnerability." It is perhaps easy to implicate 
extinction as being responsible for the latter response topography, but more 
difficult to see its role in the former topography. According to the definition 
of extinction, when positive reinforcement (i.e., controllability) is withheld 
over time, previously reinforced behavior decreases (i.e., extinguishes). Such 
an effect on the behavioral repertoire may be analogous to 'becoming 
depressed." Yet, the "resistance" topography predicted in this curvilinear 
relationship also might be explained by extinction. Specifically, perhaps the 
"overcompensation" described by Thornton (1982) and the "intensification of 
symptoms" described by Wittenborn and Maurer (1977) are analogous in 
some respects to the extinction burst phenonemon where the initia] effect of 
reinforcement loss is an increase in the previously reinforced behavior. This 
OCPD /helplessness relationship is interesting and plausible and should be 
addressed experimentally in future research (See Appendix I for a schematic 
representation of this relationship). While the present results suggest either 
no vulnerability or a resistance to learned helplessness in OCPD, until further 
research examines the possibility of the relationship proposed above, no 
definitive statement can be made with regard to the relationship between 
OCPD and learned helplessness. 
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Diagnostic Findings: AFC 
One potential explanation for the unusual findings that AFC 
performed opposite of the basic iearned helplessness effect is that their 
performance on the shuttlebox task had something to do with th.eir pre-
experimental emotional state. While subjects with serious depression were 
screened out of the study, AFC subjects were significantly more depressed 
than OCPD and NC subjects based on the BDI prior to testing (Table 24 and 
Table 25). This is interesting in light of the Miller and Seligman (1975) study 
where clinically depressed subjects performed somewhat differently than 
normal controls in a helplessness induction scenario. If such a 
pre-experiment "state" was influential in the present study, it influenced 
shuttlebox performan~e only (i.e., AFC MAACL change scores and expectancy 
ratings were in line with predictions). 
Perhaps AFC subjects exhibit unique personality characteristics or 
"traits" that were responsible for this unusual finding. AFC subjects were, in 
fact, determined to have significantly lower "trait" self-esteem than NC and 
OCPD subjects prior to the experiment. And the literature describes AFC 
subjects as feeling incompetent, helpless, and weak as opposed to OCPD and 
NC who have a more positive self-image. Perhaps such personality 
characteristics influenced the way AFC subjects perceived uncontrollability, 
responded to failure, and explained their failures. If this is true, then it is clear 
that attributional style alone is inadequate to predict vulnerability. 
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Perhaps personal control is deemphasized in AFC subjects as compared 
to NC and OCPD subjects, thus, leading AFC subjects to respond in such an 
unexpected manner. The high co-morbidity between AFC and depression is 
well-documented in the literature; however, loss of personal control may not 
contribute significantly to this demonstrated high comorbidity. In fact, the 
specificity hypothesis briefly addressed in the introduction argues that subjects 
valuing autonomy and control (i.e., OCPD) are more likely to become 
depressed when faced with achievement failure and uncontrollability; 
whereas subjects who value social approval and attention (e.g., dependent 
personality disorder) are more likely to become depressed when faced with 
social loss. Thus, mechanisms other than perceived uncontrollability may be 
more responsible for inducing depressions in AFC. This might explain AFC 
Group B's resistance to helplessness induction, but it does not fully address 
the fact that AFC Group A subjects performed worse than Group B subjects on 
the shuttlebox measures. 
Perhaps AFC Group A subjects entered the experimental situation with 
low expectations about their performance due to their low self-esteem. In fact, 
inspection of baseline expectancy ratings supports this contention; however, 
the difference between AFC and NC means only approached statistical 
significance (Table 26). Furthermore, assume that AFC Group A subjects' 
immediate success on the pretreatment task was at odds with their pessimistic 
expectations, and, thus they became more "anxious and fearful" of eventual 
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failure. Perhaps this anticipation of failure had a debilitating effect on 
performance during the test phase. Given that their baseline was "success," 
they may have believed that they had "everything to lose and nothing to 
gain." And so when faced for the first time with failure in the test phase, they 
became relatively more distressed than their Group B counterparts, and this 
distress translated into poorer shuttlebox performance. H this hypothesis is 
true, one would expect this "anxious-fearful" affective state to be reflected in 
the pretreatment mood measures. Upon first glance, the MAACL data do not 
appear to support such a hypothesis. Overall, AFC Group A is significantly 
less distressed according to MAACL-composite than AFC Group B during the 
pretreatment (Table 27 and Table 28). However, Group A is less anxious than 
Group B in Block 1 of the pretreatment, but becomes significantly more 
anxious (i.e., percent increase) from MAACL2 to MAACL3 than Group B. 
Interestingly, Group B actually experiences a mild reduction in anxiety during 
the second half of the pretreatment (Table 9). This "acceleration" in AFC 
Group A affect is interesting and seems consistent with the above speculation. 
Perhaps Group B also entered the experimental situation with low 
expectations about their performance. Their failure on the pretreatment task, 
however, was consistent with their expectations, and thus they easily accepted 
the failure and emotionally habituated to it. Given that their baseline was 
"failure," they may have believed that they had "nothing to lose and 
everything to gain." And so, when faced with failure for the first time in the 
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test phase, they were less distressed than their Group A counterparts, and this 
relatively calm affective state translated into better shuttlebox performance. 
Again, the fact that AFC Group B subjects became less anxious than AFC 
Group A subjects in Block 2 suggests that their affective state was 
"decelerating" which is consistent with the above hypothesis. 
Thus, in contrast to OCPD and normal controls, it could be argued that 
controllable scenarios are actually more ayersive and that uncontrollable 
scenarios are actually less ayersiye to AFC individuals. Thus, perceived 
uncontrollability might impact AFC differently than the other diagnostic 
groups. Again, AFC's low self-esteem, pre-experimental affective state, 
deemphasis on personal control, and/ or ct.~er personality characteristics may 
account for this finding. Obviously, further research is needed to examine 
these hypotheses. 
Triadic Group C Dilemma 
While the basic effect was demonstrated between Group A and B in the 
present study (i.e, greater helplessness in Group B), the findings that Group C 
(a) demonstrated even significantly greater deficits than Groups A and Bon 
NTC-Escape, NF, and RTl, (b) generated significantly lower expectancy ratings 
than Group A, and (c) became significantly more affectively distressed than 
Group A during the pretreatment phase, all beg for an explanation. 
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Group C as an Experimentally Helpless Group 
The MAACL disruptions and lowered expectancy ratings in Group C 
subjects suggest that something clearly happened to these subjects during the 
pretreatment phase. They became affectively distressed (i.e., even significantly 
more than Group B subjects in Block 2 (Table 29 and Table 30) and became 
significantly less confident about their upcoming performance in Block 3 
(Table 2 and Table 3). While it can be argued that Group C subjects were not 
asked to terminate the noise and, therefore, did not perceive 
uncontrollability, an alternative interpretation may be made. Perhaps Group 
C, like Group B, was, indeed, made experimentally helpless during the 
pretreatment phase. While their "perceived uncontrollability" was never 
assessed clirectly, an argument can be made that their pretreatment experience 
was response-independent and that their deficits/disruptions noted in Block 3 
were functionally, as well as, topographically similar to learned helplessness 
deficits I disruptions. 
By definition, an aversive stimulus is one whose termination is 
negatively reinforcing. The layman's definition of "aversion," according to 
Random House College Dictionary (Stein, 1975) is "a strong desire to avoid 
because of dislike; repugnance; a turning away or preventing (p. 93)." In the 
present study, Group C subjects selected and were administered an aversive 
tone and, like Group B subjects, and unlike Group A subjects, had no means 
to control the tone. If a stimulus is intense enough to warrant the label 
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"aversive" and if the underlying assumption is that the stimulus' 
termination is reinforcing, then a logical deduction is that subjects who are 
not given an opportunity to terminate the stimulus would, in fact, "perceive 
uncontrollability." Support for this perceived uncontrollability in Group C 
comes from their verbal reports assessed by the post-experiment 
questionnaire. Group C subjects were asked to generate thoughts that they 
had during the pretreatment while "simply sitting and listening to the tones." 
Not surprisingly, many subjects reported that the experience was u.."l.pleasant, 
that they had attempted to "figure the experiment out" despite not being 
asked to do so, that they they wanted to leave, and that they wondered how 
much longer they would have to endure the tones. \\r'hile no formal analyses 
were conducted on these verbal reports, they imply a "perception" of 
aversiveness and a "desire" for avoidance. 
H Group C was made experimentally helpless in the present study, one 
would expect that previous research would have obtained similar findings. 
However, recall that the present procedure, like Hiroto and Seligman's (1975) 
procedure, differed somewhat from many past triadic designs in that Group C 
was equated with Group A and B on habituation to the tone. It is being argued 
here that removing the aversiveness from the pretreatment situation by not 
exposing Group C to the tone, also may remove the perception of 
uncontrollability (i.e., there is nothing to control in the situation). As in the 
present study, Hiroto and Seligman (1975) found the basic helplessness effect 
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between Group A and B and also noted that their Group C's shuttlebox 
performance was more consistent with Group B than Group A. Group B 
subjects still demonstrated the greatest deficits of the three groups, but some 
unaddressed mechanism was responsible for Group C's deficits relative to 
Group A. 
It could be argued that perceived uncontrollability is a function of the 
context in which it occurs. A context in which subjects are exposed to an 
aversive stimulus but are provided with a response-dependent opportunity 
to terminate the stimulus (i.e., Group A) may be less aversive and less likely 
to produce perceived uncontrollability than other contexts. A context in 
which subjects are exposed to an aversive stimulus but are provided with a 
response-independent opportunity to terminate the stimulus may be more 
aversive and more likely to produce perceived uncontrollability (i.e., Group 
B). However, a context in which subjects are exposed to an aversive stimulus 
but not even provided an opportunity to terminate the stimulus may be the 
most aversive and most likely to produce perceived uncontrollability (i.e., 
Group C). Intuitively, subjects exposed to the last scenario would be more 
likely to make an external attribution for the uncontrollability (i.e., Some 
outside force controls the tones) as opposed to the internal attributions made 
for failures by Group B subjects (i.e., I should be able to control the tones). 
While the reformulation predicts that internal attributional styles for 
negative events are associated with learned helplessness, past research (i.e., 
108 
Hiroto, 1974) also demonstrates that external loci of control and failure under 
chance conditions are more likely to produce helplessness. Thus, the 
potential for such an external attribution producing helplessness deficits in a 
context similar to Group C's in the present study finds support in the 
literature. Interestingly, learned helplessness applications to actual social 
problems have often described helplessness induction scenarios similar to the 
Group C scenario being proposed here. For example, in their learned 
helplessness studies on noise pollution, Cohen, Evans, Krantz, and Stokols 
{1980) and Cohen, Evans, Krantz, Stokols, and Kelly (1981) reported that 
school children whose classrooms were exposed to uncontrollable noise 
produced by airplanes that regularly flew overhead performed more poorly in 
school than students who were not directly under the flight paths of 
airplanes. Like Group C subjects in the present study, these children were 
exposed to an aversive stimulus and were not provided with an opportunity 
to terminate the stimulus. Future studies should further investigate 
perceived uncontrollability in light of perceived opportunity to control 
outcomes. 
One might argue that Group C's pronounced shuttlebox deficits were 
due to the fact that they were placed at a disadvantage by not being exposed to 
the pretreatment task. Several points, however, argue against such a 
differential exposure effect. First, one might expect that such an effect would 
influence diagnostic groups equally. Such was not the case. AFC Group C 
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subjects actually performed better on the shuttlebox task than Group A 
subjects who had mastered the key pressing strategy in the pretreatment 
phase (Table 11). Second, if a lack of exposure to keyboard manipulation was 
solely responsible for Group C's shuttlebox deficits, one would not expect to 
see the MAACL affective disruptions and lowered expectancy ratings during 
the pretreatment. Clearly, Group C subjects were adversely affected by the 
pretreatment in some manner. Exposing Group A and B to the pretreatment 
task presumably could improve Group A and B's performance on the test 
phase task, but denying Group C the same opportunity should not adversely 
~ Group C subjects' expectations or affective state. Third, Group A subjects 
were observed to press keys in Block 3 using a response set shaped up in 
Blocks 1 and 2 that actually hindered performance on the shuttlebox task. 
Specifically, in the pretreatment phase, subjects were required to press a single 
key multiple times whereas, in the test phase, subjects were required to press 
different keys in an alternating fashion. Thus, it could be argued that a 
"practice effect" might place Groups A and B, not at an advantage, but at a 
disadvantage due to the "set" established early on. Finally, most learned 
helplessness studies utilizing the triadic design, require that Group A and B 
subjects attempt to solve some type of task in the pretreatment while Group C 
is unengaged. One might argue that attempting to solve a task in the 
pretreatment phase influences subjects' performance in the test phase as a 
result of behavioral momentum (e.g., this gets them thinking about 
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strategies, keeps them alert, keeps them moving). However, if such an 
influence is a practice effect, then it is not specific to the present study. Taken 
together, the above counterarguments appear to rule out differential exposure 
to the pretreatment task as an explanation for the Group C finding. 
Critique of the Study 
A general criticism of the study might be that the computerized 
experimental task used in the present study may have induced "computer 
fear" in some subjects which may have accounted for the unusual diagnostic 
and triadic findings. However, given that subjects were randomly assigned to 
triadic groups within each diagnostic group and given that such a fear 
conceivably could be found in all three diagnostic groups, this criticism is not 
of great concern. Furthermore, there is precedence in the learned helplessness 
literature for utilizing computerized experimental tasks (e.g., Peterson et al., 
1993). Other points that must be acknowledged when evaluating the present 
study are a) that, as in any experiment, the possibility exists that the predicted 
and unpredicted findings were the result of Type I and Type IT errors, b) that 
the ecological validity of the study is debatable, c) that the methodological 
constraints placed on the study may have made it difficult to capture 
hypothesized results experimentally with regard to some predictions (e.g., 
OCPD vulnerability) and more likely to obtain hypothesized results with 
regard to other predictions (e.g., triadic group differences), and d) that the 
statistical power needed to demonstrate certain actual group differences may 
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have been inadequate. 
Another possibie limitation of the present study may have been the 
use of analogues. The high false positive selection rate of the SCID-II could 
have diluted the sample, making true distinctions undetectable. 
Furthermore, while psychopathology is on a continuum and the use of 
analogues is justified, the Janus-faced nature of personality may have made 
OCPD analogues more resistant than true obsessive compulsive personality 
disordered individuals to the effects of helplessness induction. However, 
utilizing this sample did not prevent detecting the vulnerablity marker 
assessed by the ASQ. Failing to detect differences in attributional style would 
have been predicted in addition to failing to detect differences on the other 
measures if using a heterogenous sample were determined to be problematic. 
Therefore, the use of analogues screened using the self-report version of the 
SOD-II is not viewed as major concern. 
Overall, the present study is valuable in that it raises important 
questions and concerns about learned helplessness research and theory. It is 
argued, here, that continued healthy debate and input from fresh, alternative 
perspectives would at the very least correct flaws and improve the status of 
learned helplessness as a viable theory of depression (See Appendix J for an 
alternative perspective on learned helplessness). 
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Implications for Treatment and Prevention 
A major focus of the present study was to answer Peterson and 
Seligman's (1984) call to identify certain groups "at-risk" for depression. 
While the study identified the anxious-fearful cluster as a whole as being 
vulnerable based on the ASQ, the experimental findings did not. 
Nevertheless, the future identification of such groups has important 
treatment and prevention implications. For example, if treating a depressed 
client with certain personality features known to make one at-risk to 
helplessness induction, certain therapeutic strategies might be indicated. One 
general strategy might be to help instill or reinstill a sense of control or 
response- dependence in an individual. Treatments such as Beck's (1976; 
1979) cognitive therapy, Ellis' (1973) rational-emotive therapy, or 
reattributional or expectancy training therapies (e.g., Hollon & Garber, 1980) 
are therapeutic approaches whose functional mechanisms seem consistent 
with the "deficit reversal" strategy in the learned helplessness literature. For 
example, if the actual contingencies in the client's environment are response-
dependent but the client "perceives uncontrollability," this irrational 
cognition could be put to the test and eventually rejected, just as Seligman's 
dogs were dragged to the opposite compartment of the shuttlebox and forced 
to experience the actual contingencies. However, in situations where 
"perceived uncontrollability" is an accurate reflection of at least some of the 
environmental contingencies, alternative strategies may be indicated. For 
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example, the helpless client exposed to truly uncontrollable events (i.e., 
terminal cancer) might be helped to discriminate between those situations 
that are uncontrollable and those that are controllable. In such a treatment 
plan, those uncontrollable events might be addressed by having the client 
learn new behaviors or coping mechanisms that could help him or her accept 
certain inevitabilities (i.e., death). Also, in such a treatment plan, highlighting 
and capitalizing upon certain response-dependent outcomes (i.e., engaging in 
behaviors that may iru1uence qualit'J of life) could reinstill a sense of control 
and lessen the debilitating effects of helplessness. 
The Group C finding in the present study suggests that individuals 
who are exposed to aversive stimulation but are not given an opportunity to 
control this stimulation may become helpless in a manner similar to Group B 
subjects. Therefore, it follows that the above treatments would be equally 
applicable to clients whose depression is acquired in a context similar to the 
Group C context. For example, similar measures could be used to address the 
depression in a child who has experienced a series of deaths or the depression 
in an adult who lives in a violent, crime-ridden neighborhood. 
With regard to treating the obsessive compulsive, whose problem is 
not with a deficit in ego-strength or a lack of a response independent world 
view, but instead, with such "excesses," measures could be taken to 
deemphasize the importance placed on control, autonomy, and achievement, 
so that when perceived uncontrollability occurs (which inevitably it will), 
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such individuals will be better prepared for such an event. Such measures 
might include attributional retraining, cognitive therapy, and systematic 
desensitization to aversive uncontrollable situations. 
With regard to treating the obsessive compulsives' counterparts in the 
anxious-fearful cluster, the findings in the present study suggest that they 
may benefit from treatment designed to target their low self-esteem and, in 
contrast to obsessive compulsives, target their avoidance and perceived 
aversiveness of situations where personal control is required. As with 
obsessive compulsives, attributional retraining, cognitive therapy, and 
systematic desensitization may be indicated. However, unlike obsessive 
compulsives, their desensitization might target aversive controllable 
situations. 
If a learned helplessness mechanism does, in fact, come into play in the 
personality disorder I depression relationship, theoretically, preventive 
measures could be employed to block the onset of a depression in a 
personality disordered individual. Or better yet, these measures could be 
extended to construct an environment that prevents the development of 
certain personality features which might render one susceptible to a learned 
helplessness depression. How one might employ such preventive measures 
in the lives of individuals has been well-documented in the literature (e.g., 
Seligman, 1975; Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Just as treatment interventions 
might become more effective by instilling "controllability" or "enhanced 
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perception of response-dependence," so too might prevention strategies. 
Constructing an environment, for example, for a child, so as to promote 
"mastery" over one's world, might in a sense, immunize the child against a 
potentially detrimental learned helplessness depression in the future. This 
"mastery," according to Seligman (1975), may facilitate ego-strength. Or, again, 
in the case of the obsessive compulsive personality disordered individual 
who demonstrates excessive ego-strength, deemphasing personal control 
while maintaining a healthy world view of response-dependence might 
prevent the onset of a depression resulting from "perceived 
uncontrollabili ty." 
Thus, depending on the unique personality of the individual, different 
strategies might be indicated in preventing the onset of depression or treating 
the depression once established. In conclusion, further research designed to 
clarify the relationship between personality disorders and depression is 
needed. Such research endeavors may continue to help alleviate and prevent 
the suffering of individuals. 
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SOD-II Profiles of Participants 
A~rQD}!:m CytQff* f~r~nruit}!: Di::!Q&:d~r S~al~ 
AVD (4) Avoidant 
DEP (5) Dependent 
oc (5) Obsessive Compulsive 
P-A (5) Passive Aggressive 
SDT (5) Self-Defeating (Scale not used) 
PAR (4) Paranoid 
STY (5) Schizo typal 
SZD (4) Schizoid 
IDS (4) Histrionic 
NAR (5) Narcissistic 
BRD (5) Borderline 
ASL <18 (4) and >18 (4) Antisocial 
• Scores at or above cutoff meet scale criterion 
S AVD DEP 0-C P-A SDT PAR STY SZD HIS NAR BRD ASL 
A01 3 5 4 2 3 1 3 1 2 4 1 0 
B01 4 3 1 1 0 1 2 3 1 4 2 0 
COl 3 1 2 5 1 3 3 2 2 4 4 0 
A02 5 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 2 3 3 0 
C02 6 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 6 3 2 
A03 1 5 3 0 3 2 4 1 3 2 3 1 
B03 4 4 3 3 5 1 4 1 2 4 3 1 
C03 7 6 4 2 1 1 2 2 0 2 1 0 
A04 5 5 4 5 5 2 3 2 0 3 4 1 
B04 2 6 4 2 1 0 2 2 1 2 2 3 
C04 2 3 4 5 3 2 3 1 3 3 4 0 
A05 4 2 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 2 3 0 
B05 2 5 2 5 2 3 4 3 0 1 1 0 
cos 7 5 4 3 4 3 4 2 2 4 4 0 
A06 4 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 0 0 
B06 4 5 2 1 2 0 3 2 1 1 3 0 
C06 3 5 2 3 2 1 2 1 3 3 3 0 
A07 3 8 2 4 4 1 3 2 3 4 4 0 
B07 1 5 4 3 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 0 
C07 3 2 3 7 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 0 
A08 2 5 4 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 4 0 
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~ AVD DEP 0-C P-A SDT PAR STY SZD IDS NAR BRD ASL 
BOB 0 2 4 5 3 3 3 2 3 3 0 1 
COB 7 7 4 5 3 3 5 3" 3 4 4 0 
A09 5 1 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 
B09 4 2 4 3 1 3 2 1 4 3 0 0 
C09 4 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 0 
A16 0 2 4 3 3 2 4 1 2 3 1 0 
B16 0 2 4 0 3 0 1 1 2 3 1 0 
C16 1 1 4 1 1 0 3 3 2 3 0 0 
A17 0 2 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 
B17 0 3 4 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 
C17 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 2 2 1 0 
AlB 0 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 
B1B 1 3 4 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 0 
C1B 3 0 1 3 3 0 3 1 1 2 0 0 
A19 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 3 4 1 0 
B19 2 2 4 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 0 
C19 2 2 3 2 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 0 
A20 2 0 2 0 2 1 3 2 2 1 0 0 
B20 0 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 
C20 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 
A21 0 1 0 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 
B21 2 2 3 0 3 3 1 3 2 3 2 0 
C21 0 3 4 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 3 0 
A22 0 0 2 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 
B22 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 
C22 0 1 3 1 1 2 3 0 0 2 3 0 
A23 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 
B23 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C23 0 0 4 2 1 2 3 0 2 3 1 0 
A24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 
B24 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 
C24 1 0 3 3 1 3 2 2 3 4 4 1 
A25 2 3 2 1 2 0 1 2 2 2 1 0 
B25 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 4 
C25 0 1 3 4 1 0 0 0 1 3 2 0 
A26 2 2 4 4 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 0 
B26 3 3 4 0 3 0 3 1 1 4 2 0 
C26 0 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 0 
A27 0 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 
B27 1 0 4 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 
C27 0 3 2 0 2 0 0 1 2 2 3 1 
A2B 1 3 4 0 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 0 
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S AVD DEP 0-C P-A SDT PAR STY SZD IDS NAR BRD ASL 
B28 1 3 2 3 0 0 0 2 0 4 1 0 
C28 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 4 
A29 0 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 1 
B29 1 1 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 
C29 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 
A30 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 1 1 
B30 0 2 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 4 4 3 
C30 0 2 3 0 2 0 1 2 3 2 3 0 
A31 3 2 5 2 1 3 4 2 2 4 4 0 
B31 1 1 6 2 4 1 4 3 1 4 3 0 
C31 2 3 5 2 3 1 3 2 2 4 2 1 
A32 2 " 6 1 4 2 2 1 1 3 4 0 ":11: 
B32 1 1 6 0 3 2 1 3 2 2 0 0 
C32 3 2 6 4 2 3 3 2 3 4 0 1 
A33 1 0 6 4 0 1 4 3 3 3 1 2 
B33 0 4 5 2 4 1 2 1 3 4 0 0 
C33 1 2 5 1 1 2 4 2 2 2 0 0 
A34 1 2 7 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 
B34 2 2 5 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 0 
C34 1 2 5 4 4 2 3 3 3 5 0 0 
A35 1 2 5 1 1 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 
B35 0 2 5 3 2 1 3 1 1 4 1 3 
C35 0 1 8 2 3 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 
A36 0 1 5 1 2 0 1 1 2 4 0 2 
B36 2 4 5 0 0 3 1 1 2 2 2 0 
C36 1 1 5 1 4 1 2 3 1 1 1 0 
A37 0 3 5 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 3 1 
B37 0 2 6 0 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 
C37 2 1 5 3 1 0 1 1 2 4 0 0 
A38 1 0 6 0 3 0 1 2 2 1 2 0 
B38 2 2 5 2 3 1 2 2 3 4 3 0 
C38 1 2 5 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 
A39 2 3 6 2 3 4 4 1 2 4 0 0 
B39 0 4 5 3 3 3 0 2 2 2 1 3 
C39 0 2 5 0 5 3 2 2 4 2 2 0 
A46 2 3 3 5 4 5 1 2 1 3 3 3 
B46 6 3 4 1 2 2 6 2 3 4 4 0 
C46 4 2 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 3 1 
A47 0 1 4 5 2 4 4 3 0 4 3 0 
B47 0 4 2 5 2 2 3 0 6 4 4 0 
C47 5 2 3 1 3 2 5 2 0 4 4 0 
A48 2 2 3 5 4 7 1 3 3 3 2 0 
129 
S AVD DEP o-c P-A SDT PAR STY SZD HIS NAR BRD ASL 
B48 0 6 2 3 5 2 1 0 3 5 3 0 
C48 4 5 4 1 4 3 4 1 2 3 3 1 
A49 2 6 2 6 3 3 2 2 3 s 3 8 
B49 0 s 3 4 s 2 4 1 2 3 s 2 
C49 4 5 3 2 4 3 3 3 1 2 s 0 
ASO 3 6 4 4 4 2 4 2 3 s 4 1 
BSO 2 3 3 5 2 2 3 3 s 3 4 1 
C50 4 8 4 4 6 4 4 2 3 4 4 0 
AS1 2 2 s 2 2 s 3 3 2 4 2 0 
B51 0 3 6 2 1 1 0 1 4 4 0 0 
C51 3 4 6 4 1 3 3 1 2 7 4 0 
AS2 2 3 7 4 4 0 3 2 3 s 3 0 
BS2 2 3 6 1 3 0 0 3 2 4 1 3 
C52 0 4 s 2 2 2 1 1 2 s 1 1 
AS3 1 1 7 2 4 s 4 1 1 4 1 2 
BS3 0 4 5 2 1 3 2 4 1 2 0 0 
C53 2 3 6 2 3 2 3 2 3 8 3 1 
A 54 2 2 5 2 2 0 3 4 1 4 0 1 
B54 3 3 6 3 6 4 3 3 3 1 2 0 
C54 2 3 5 1 3 1 5 3 2 3 2 6 
ASS 3 2 6 4 4 3 1 2 3 6 1 3 
BS5 0 3 6 1 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 0 
css 1 4 6 .... 1 3 1 1 4 3 1 0 .;) 
AS6 1 4 s 3 3 1 2 2 4 3 0 0 
BS6 0 1 s 2 3 2 3 0 4 2 2 0 
C56 0 0 5 4 2 1 2 2 3 6 2 1 
A60 0 1 3 0 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
A61 6 6 4 s 4 3 3 2 2 4 s 0 
B61 4 s 4 7 s 3 4 0 1 3 6 1 
C61 3 7 3 4 1 3 4 5 3 4 1 0 
A62 4 3 4 3 2 2 4 2 s 4 3 0 
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Table 2 
Two-way Analysis of Variance on Change in Expectancy (ER1-ER2) 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
Source Qf Sums of Sqpares Mean Square E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 4.86 2.43 1.59 .2079 
Triadic Group 2 75.48 37.74 24.69 .0001* 
Interaction 4 5.94 1.49 .97 .4255 
Error 125 191.05 1.53 
"" Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
Table3 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on Change in 
Expectancy Ratings 
Comparison Mean Diff. Scheffe F-test 
Avs. B -1.81 24.10 * 
Avs.C -.66 3.17* 
Bvs. C 1.15 9.31 * 




Multivariate Analysis of Variance on MAACL, NTC-Escape, RTl 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
(MANOVA #1) 













*Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
F p 
.279 .9465 




Multivariate Analysis of Variance on MAACL, NTC-Escape, RT1 
with Modified Triadic Group and Categorized ASQ-Composite as Factors 
(MANOVA #2) 
Source Wilks' Lambda Num df Dendf F p 
Categorized 
ASQ-Composite .976 3 83 .674 .5701 
Modified 
Triadic Group .909 3 83 2.769 .0468 * 
Interaction .955 3 83 1.289 .2837 
-----------------------------------------------------
* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 6 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance on MAACL, ER1-ER2, RT1 
with Modified Triadic Group and Categorized ASQ-Composite 
as Factors 
(MANOVA #3) 
Source Wilks' Lambda Num df Dendf F p 
Categorized 
ASQ-Composite .992 3 83 .218 .8837 
Modified 
Triadic Group .577 3 83 20.281 .0001 * 
Interaction .978 3 83 .623 .6024 
-----------------------------------------------------
*Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 7 
Two-way Analyses of Variance on MAACL Scores 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
ANOVA for Change in Overall Affect (MAACL3-MAACL1) 
Source gf Sums of Squares Mean Sq.uare E 12 
Diagnosis 2 176.10 88.05 .57 .5663 
Triadic Group 2 1325.73 662.86 4.30 .0156* 
Interaction 4 379.42 94.85 .62 .6523 
Error 126 19421.82 154.14 
ANOV A for Change in Depression (D3-D1) 
Source d.f Sums of Sq.uares Mean Square E l2 
Diagnosis 2 32.39 16.20 .51 .5992 
Triadic Group 2 227.12 113.56 3.60 .03* 
Interaction 4 85.80 21.45 .68 .6064 
Error 127 4000.80 31.50 
ANOVA for Change in Anxiety (A3-A1) 
Source Qf Sums of Squares Mean Sq.uare E. 12 
Diagnosis 2 7.47 3.73 .30 .7436 
Triadic Group 2 74.64 37.32 2.97 .055 
Interaction 4 22.04 5.51 .44 .7808 
Error 127 1597.12 12.58 
ANOVA for Change in Hostility (H3-H1) 
Source Qf Sums of Sq.yares Mean Sq.uare E 12 
Diagnosis 2 30.81 15.40 .80 .4522 
Triadic Group 2 160.37 80.18 4.16 .0178* 
Interaction 4 73.38 18.35 .95 .4368 
Error 127 2449.27 19.29 
* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 8 
Tests of Multiple Comparisons of MAACL Change Scores 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on Overall Change in 
Affect Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
Avs. B -7.38 5.14. 4.04. 
Avs.C -5.57 5.08. 2.36 
Bvs. C 1.81 5.19 .24 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on Depression (03-Dl) 
Change Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Scheffe F-test 
Avs. B -3.05 3.42. 
Avs.C -2.18 1.77 
Bvs. C .87 .27 
(cont.) 
Table 8 (cont.) 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on Anxiety (A3-A1) 
Change Scores 
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Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD 
Avs. B -1.71 1.45"' 
Avs.C -1.37 1.44 
Bvs.C .34 1.47 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on Hostility (H3-H1) 
Change Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
Avs. B -2.47 1.82"' 3.62"' 
Avs.C -2.02 1.81"' 2.44 
Bvs.C .45 1.84 .12 
"' Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 9 
One-way Analysis of Variance on Percent Change in Anxiety 
During Block 2 with Triadic Group as the Factor 
(AFCONLY) 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square 
Between groups 2 1.453 .727 
Within groups 42 13.803 .329 




Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on 
Percent Change in Anxiety During Block 2 (AFC Only) 
139 













Two-way Analyses of Variance on Shuttlebox (Block 3) Measures 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
A.NOVA for Number of Trials to Reach Escape Criterion (NTC-E) 
Source df Sums of Sqyares Mean Sqyare E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 10.96 5.48 .11 .8993 
Triadic Group 2 551.92 275.96 5.35 .0059 * 
Interaction 4 381.79 95.45 1.85 .1232 
Error 127 6549.90 51.57 
ANOVA for Number of Trials to Reach Escape Criterion (NTC-E): 
Modified Model (OCPD Excl~ded) 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Sq_uare E p 
Diagnosis 1 8.303 8.303 .154 .6954 
Triadic Group 2 346.008 173.004 3.215 .0451 * 
Interaction 2 378.732 189.366 3.519 .0340 * 
Error 85 4574.032 53.812 
ANOV A for Number of Failures (NF) 
Source df Suros of Sqyares Mean Sqyare E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 4.19 2.09 .04 .9651 
Triadic Group 2 635.11 317.56 5.39 .0057 * 
Interaction 4 319.95 79.99 1.36 .2523 
Error 126 7421.36 58.90 
(cont.) 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
ANOV A for Number of Failures (NF) 
Modified Model (OCPD Excluded) 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Sqyare E J2 
Diagnosis 1 4.172 4.172 .066 .7973 
Triadic Group 2 410.197 205.098 3.265 .0431 * 
Interaction 2 315.724 157.862 2.513 .0871 
Error 84 5275.897 62.808 
ANOV A for Reaction Time-Trial One (RT1) 
Source Q! Sums of Squares Mean Square F l2 
Diagnosis 2 1.38 .69 .18 .8352 
Triadic Group 2 38.00 19.00 4.95 .0085* 
Interaction 4 18.85 4.71 1.23 .3026 
Error 125 479.93 3.84 
ANOV A for Reaction Time-Trial One (RTl) 
Modified Model (OCPD Excluded) 
Source .df Sums of Sqyares Mean Square E. J2 
Diagnosis 1 .83 .83 .239 .6263 
Triadic Group 2 18.898 9.449 2.719 .0718 
Interaction 2 15.207 7.603 2.188 .1186 
Error 83 288.434 3.475 
ANOV A for Mean Latency to Initiate Response (MU) 
Source Qi Sums of Sqyares Mean Square E. ~ 
Diagnosis 2 4.20 2.10 .64 .5314 
Triadic Group 2 11.26 5.63 1.70 .1860 
Interaction 4 2.32 .58 .18 .9507 
Error 125 412.69 3.30 
(cont.) 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
ANOVA for Number of Trials to Avoidance Criterion (NTC-A) 
Source .df s ~,.. urnS Ot ~quares Mean Square E. ~ 
Diagnosis 2 8.00 4.00 .11 .8916 
Triadic Group 2 35.72 17.86 .51 .6004 
Interaction 4 63.64 15.91 .46 .7676 
Error 127 4427.90 34.87 
ANOV A for Number of Correct Avoidance Responses (NA) 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Sq.yare E. ~ 
Diagnosis 2 34.70 17.35 .36 .7001 
Triadic Group 2 43.10 21.55 .44 .6424 
Interaction 4 56.94 14.23 .29 .8818 
Error 126 6112.91 48.52 
* Statistically Significant at the .05 level of significance 
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Table 12 
Tests of Multiple Comparisons of Shuttlebox (Block 3) Measures 









Mean Diff. Scheffe F-test 
-.62 .08 
-4.53 4.52 * 
-3.91 3.26 * 



















Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
.82 .21 
.81 * 4.48 * 
.83 * 2.62 
* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
Table 13 
Two-way Analyses of Variance on Primary ASQ Scale Scores 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
ANOVA for ASQ-Negati.ve Events 
Source gf Sums of Squares Mean Sqyare E 
Diagnosis 2 5.21 2.6 9.18 
Triadic Group 2 .36 .18 .63 
Interaction 4 .23 .06 .20 
Error 127 36.00 .28 
ANOVA for ASQ-Positi.ve Events 
Source df Sums of Sqyares Mean Sqyare E 
Diagnosis 2 4.18 2.09 6.09 
Triadic Group 2 .59 .29 .85 
Interaction 4 .70 .18 .51 
Error 127 43.64 .34 
ANOVA for ASQ--composite 
Source df Su._ms of Squares Mean Square E 
Diagnosis 2 17.38 8.69 12.47 
Triadic Group 2 .56 .28 .40 
Interaction 4 .35 .09 .12 
Error 127 88.50 .70 
















Tests of Multiple Comparisons of Primary ASQ Scale Scores 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on ASQ-Negati.ve Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Scheffe F-test 
AFCvs.NC .45 8.52"' 
AFCvs.OCPD .10 .39 
NCvs.OCPD -.36 5.25"' 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on ASQ-Positive Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
AFCvs.NC -.41 .24"' 5.80"' 
AFCvs.OCPD -.29 .24"' 2.89 
NCvs.OCPD .12 .24 .49 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on ASQ-Composite 
Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
AFCvs.NC .87 .34"' 12.77"' 
AFCvs.OCPD .39 .34"' 2.57 
NC vs. OCPD -.48 .34 "' 3.84 * 
"'Statistically significant at .05 level of significance 
Table 15 
Two-way Analyses of Variance on Selected ASQ Subscales 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
ANOVA of Internality for Negative Events 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square E. 
Diagnosis 2 7.18 3.59 5.26 
Triadic Group 2 .07 .03 .05 
Interaction 4 3.81 .95 1.40 
Error 127 86.59 .68 
ANOV A of Stability for Positive Events 
Source .df Sums of Squares Mean Square E. 
Diagnosis 2 4.46 2.23 4.57 
Triadic Group 2 1.24 .62 1.27 
Interaction 4 1.54 .39 .79 
Error 127 61.89 .49 
ANOV A of Globality for Achievement Events 
Source Qf Sums of Squares Mean Square E. 
Diagnosis 2 3.85 1.93 2.77 
Triadic Group 2 2.36 1.18 1.70 
Interaction 4 2.21 .55 .80 
Error 127 88.17 .69 
ANOV A of Internality for Positive Events 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square E. 
Diagnosis 2 7.84 3.92 7.16 
Triadic Group 2 .21 .11 .19 
Interaction 4 1.22 .31 .56 




















Table 15 (cont.) 
ANOV A of Internality for Positive Events 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square F ~ 
Diagnosis 2 10.04 5.02 6.72 .0017 * 
Triadic Group 2 3.10 1.55 2.08 .1297 
Interaction 4 1.33 .33 .45 .7754 
Error 127 94.91 .75 
* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
Table 16 
Selected Tests of Multiple Comparisons of ASQ Subscales 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on 
Internality for Negative Events 
Comparison Mean Diff . Scheffe F-test 
.AFC vs. NC .56 5.32 * 
AFCvs.OCPD .25 1.03 
NCvs.OCPD -.31 1.65 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on 
Stability for Positive Events 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
AFCvs. NC -.41 .29 * 3.87 * 
AFCvs. OCPD -.35 .29 * 2.90 
NCvs.OCPD .05 .29 .06 
(cont.) 
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Table 16 (cont.) 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on 
Globality for Achievement Events 
149 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD 
AFC vs. NC .05 .35 
AFCvs.OCPD -.34 .35 
NCvs.OCPD -.39 .35 * 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on 
Internality for Positive Events 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
AFCvs.NC -.57 .30 * 6.96 * 
AFCvs.OCPD -.20 .30 .87 
NCvs.OCPD .37 .30 * 2.89 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on 
Globality for Negative Events 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD Scheffe F-test 
AFC vs. NC .54 .36 * 4.41* 
AFCvs.OCPD -.06 .36 .06 
NCvs.OCPD -.60 .36 * 5.53* 
* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
150 
Table 17 













* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
10.617 .0001 * 
Table 18 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on 
TSC5-Total Positive Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Scheffe F-test 
AFCvs.NC -23.336 8.788 * 
AFCvs.OCPD -20.918 7.138 * 
NCvs.OCPD 2.418 .096 




Two-way Analyses of Variance on Post-Experiment Questionnaire Ratings 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
(Questions Regarding Pretreatment) 
Table 19a 
ANOV A of Pretreatment Confidence in Strategy Ratings 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Sq.uare E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 13.379 6.69 1.742 .1813 
Triadic Group 1 1309.05 1309.05 340.896 .0001 * 
Interaction 2 2.946 1.473 .384 .6826 
Error 85 326.402 3.84 
Table 19b 
ANOV A of Pretreatment Tone Aversiveness Ratings 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Sq.uare .E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 10.62 5.31 1.085 .3411 
Triadic Group 2 .927 .463 .095 .9097 
Interaction 4 7.093 1.773 .362 .8351 
Error 127 621.74 4.896 
Table 19c 
ANOV A of Decibel Levels 
Source .df Sum.s of Squares Mean Sq_uare E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 67.307 33.653 .361 .6977 
Triadic Group 2 223.033 111.516 1.196 .3057 
Interaction 4 144.875 36.219 .389 .8165 







Table 19 (cont.) 
Table 19d 
.ANOVA of Pretreatment Importance Ratings 
df Suros of Squares Mean Square 
2 4.204 2.102 
1 15.116 115.116 
2 1.122 .561 





23.285 .0001 * 
.114 .8928 
.ANOVA of Pretreatment Performance Expectancy Ratings 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Sq_uare .E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 13.467 6.734 1.836 .1658 
Triadic Group 1 931.557 931.557 254.008 .0001 * 
Interaction 2 10.173 5.086 1.387 .2555 
Error 84 308.064 3.667 
Table 19f 
ANOV A of Pretreatment Effort Ratings 
Source df Sums of Sauares Mean Sauare .E F 
Diagnosis 2 3.502 1.751 .244 .7844 
Triadic Group 1 6.909 6.909 .961 .3298 
Interaction 2 16.862 8.431 1.173 .3146 
Error 84 308.064 3.667 
* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 20 
Two-way Analyses of Variance on Post-Experiment Questionnaire Ratings 
with Triadic Group and Diagnostic Group as Factors 
(Questions Regarding Test Phase) 
Table20a 
ANOV A of Test Phase Confidence in Strategy Ratings 
Source Qf Sums of Squares Mean Sq_uare .E 12 
Diagnosis 2 17.086 8.543 1.04 .3563 
Triadic Group 2 4.031 2.015 .245 .7827 
Interaction 4 17.478 4.369 .532 .7123 
Error 127 1042.766 8.211 
Table20b 
ANOV A of Test Phase Effort Ratings 
Source df Sums of Sq_uares Mean Square E p 
Diagnosis 2 1.419 .709 .169 .8446 
Triadic Group 2 3.519 1.759 .419 .6583 
Interaction 4 18.632 4.658 1.111 .3545 
Error 126 528.433 4.194 
Table 20c 
ANOV A of Test Phase Performance Expectancy Ratings 
Source .df Sums of Squares Mean Sqyare E p 
Diagnosis 2 13.545 6.773 1.182 .3100 
Triadic Group 2 3.078 1.539 .269 .7649 
Interaction 4 19.064 4.766 .832 .5074 
Error 126 721.952 5.73 
(cont.) 
Table 20 (cont.) 
Table20d 
ANOVA of Test Phase Tone Aversiveness Ratings 
Source df Sums of Sqyares Mean Square E. 
Diagnosis 2 21.241 10.621 1.731 
Triadic Group 2 29.916 14.958 2.439 
Interaction 4 33.250 8.312 1.355 
Error 127 779.033 6.134 
Table 20e 
ANOV A of Test Phase Importance Ratings 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square E. 
Diagnosis 2 1.473 .737 .165 
Triadic Group 2 22.184 11.092 2.485 
Interaction 4 5.878 1.469 .329 
Error 126 562.429 4.464 
Table 20f 
ANOV A of Test Phase Inability Attribution Hatings for Failures 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Sqyare E 
Diagnosis 2 33.289 16.644 1.984 
Triadic Group 2 45.120 22.560 2.689 
Interaction 4 5.246 1.312 .156 















ANOVA of Test Phase Lack of Effort Attribution Ratings for Failures 
Source df Sums of Sqyares Mean Sqyare E p 
Diagnosis 2 29.562 14.781 1.966 .1443 
Triadic Group 2 4.214 2.107 .28 .7561 
Interaction 4 4.547 1.137 .151 .9622 
Error 126 947.414 7.519 
(cont.) 
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Table 20 (cont.) 
Table 20h 
ANOV A of Test Phase Impossibility Ratings for Failures 
Source df Sums of Sqy.ares Mean Square E. ~ 
Diagnosis 2 1.62 .81 .109 .8972 
Triadic Group 2 9.765 4.883 .655 .5214 
Interaction 4 56.931 14.233 1.908 .1131 
Error 127 947.366 7.46 
Table 20i 
ANOV A of Test Phase Initial Confidence Ratings 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square E 12 
Diagnosis 2 .917 .459 .12 .8867 
Triadic Group 2 16.638 8.319 2.183 .1169 
Interaction 4 13.115 3.279 .86 .4898 
Error 127 483.952 3.811 
Table 20j 
ANOV A of Impression Ratings 
Source df Sums of Sq_uares Mean Square E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 14.288 7.144 1.344 .2644 
Triadic Group 2 23.352 11.676 2.197 .1153 
Interaction 4 22.001 5.5 1.035 .3919 
Error 127 674.952 5.315 
Table 20k 
ANOV A of Interest in the Experiment Ratings 
Source df Sums of Sqy.ares Mean Sq_uare E ~ 
Diagnosis 2 9.897 4.948 1.143 .3222 
Triadic Group 2 20.118 10.059 2.323 .1021 
Interaction 4 11.517 2.879 .665 .6175 
Error 127 549.945 4.330 
*Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 21 
Selected Tests of Multiple Comparisons of Post-Experiment 
Questionnaire Ratings 
Com1Jarison 







(Pretreatment and Test Phase) 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on 





Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on 






















Table 21 (cont.) 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on 





Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on 














Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on 
Test Phase Lack of Effort Attribution for Failure 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD 
AFC vs. NC 1.133 1.122 * 
AFCvs.OCPD .667 1.122 






Table 21 (cont.) 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on 













One-way Analysis of Variance of Diagnostic Group on Percent Increase 
in Depressive Affect During Block 2 (Group B Only) 
Source Qf Sums of Squares Mean Sq_uare F l2 
Between Groups 2 .236 .118 2.374 .1058 
Within Groups 41 2.041 .05 
Total 43 2.277 
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Table 23 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on Percent Increase in 
Depressive Mfect During Block 2 (Group B Only) 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD 
AFC vs. NC -.109 .167 
AFCvs.OCPD .067 .167 
NCvs.OCPD .176 .165 ot 
*Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 24 
One-way Analysis of Variance of Diagnostic Group on BDI Scores 
Source df $ums of Squares Mean Square E l2 
Between Groups 2 206.13 103.07 8.44 .0004"' 
Within Groups 133 1623.25 12.20 
Total 135 1829.38 
"' Statistically Significant at the .05 level of significance 
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Table 25 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Diagnostic Group on BDI Scores 
Comparison Mean Diff. Scheffe F-test 
AFCvs. NC 2.87 7.67"' 
AFCvs.OCPD 2.24 4.64"' 
NCvs.OCPD -.62 .36 
"' Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table26 
One-way Analysis of Variance of Diagnostic Group on ER1 Scores 
Source df 
BebNeenGroups 1 
Within Groups 89 
Total 90 
(OCPD Excluded from the Model) 








One-way Analysis of Variance of Triadic Group on MAACL-composite 
(AFCONLY) 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square E ~ 
Between Groups 2 977.315 488.657 3.387 .0433 * 
Within Groups 42 6059.885 144.283 
Total 44 7037.2 
* Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 28 
Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on MAACL-Composite 
(AFCOnly) 
Comparison Mean Diff. Scheffe F-test 
Avs. B -11.42 3.374* 
Avs. C -5.929 .943 
Bvs.C 5.49 .756 
*Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
Table 29 
One-way Analysis of Variance of Triadic Group on Change in 
MAACL-Composite During Block 2 
Source Qf Sums of Sq.yares Mean Square E. 
Between Groups 2 188.79 94.39 2.99 
Within Groups 133 4199.1 31.57 






Test of Multiple Comparisons of Triadic Group on MAACL-Composite 
During Block 2 
Comparison Mean Diff. Fisher PLSD 
A vs. B 1.57 2.33 
Avs.C -1.34 2.32 
Bvs.C -2.91 2.36* 
*Statistically Significant at .05 level of significance 
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Table 31 
Group B Means of OCPD and NC on NTC-Escape, NF, and RTl 
OCPP NC 
Group A Group B Group A Group B 
NTC-Escape 10.93 12.00 9.19 13.33 
8.27 9.73 6.50 10.00 
RTl 4.49 5.25 4.95 5.81 
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APPENDIXC 
Expectancy Rating Forms 
ERl 
Even though you haven't been exposed to the task yet, how well 
do you expect to do on the upcoming task? 
PLEASE READ THE WORDS CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 
I don't expect to 
do well at all 
3 4 5 
ER2 
6 7 8 9 10 
I expect to do 
very well 
How well do you expect to do on the next part of the experiment? 
PLEASE READ THE WORDS CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 
I don't expect to 
do well at all 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I expect to do 
very well 
.. t\PPENDIX D 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
THINK BACK TO THE FIRST PHASE OF THE EXPERIMENT 
WHILE ANSWERING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 
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REMEMBER: THE FIRST PHASE WAS DMDED INTO TWO SECTIONS. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE THE SAME. 
1. In the first part of the experiment, what strategy did you use to turn off the 
noise? 
PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL: 
2. How confident are you that your strategy stopped the noise in the first part 
of the experiment? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not confident at all Very Confident 
3. How unpleasant was the noise to you when it was on in the first part of the 
experiment? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not unpleasant at all Extremely Unpleasant 
4. How well did you do on the first part of the experiment? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely bad Extremely good 
(Continued on next page) 
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5. How important was it for you to actually figure out the strategy and stop the 
noise yourself in the first part of the experiment? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not important at all Very Important 
6. How hard did you try to stop the noise yourself in the first part of the 
experiment? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not hard at all Very hard 
7. How well would you expect to do if the task were to start up again? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I wouldn't expect to do well at all I'd expect to do very well 
8. On #7 above, why did you circle the number you circled? 
PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DEIAJL: 
NOTE: GROUP C subjects were not administered the above questions. 
Instead, they were asked to write down their thoughts during the 
pretreatment phase. All subjects were administered the following questions: 
Questions 9-16 were identical to 1-8 EXCEPT they refer to performance in 
Block 3 
(Continued on next page) 
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17. In the last task, when you first saw the shuttlebox appear on the computer 
monitor, what were you thinking? (in other words, WHAT WERE YOU 
THINKING BEFORE YOU EVEN TRIED TO STOP THE NOISE?) 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 
I definitely will not be able 
to stop the noise 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I definitely will be able 
to stop the noise 
18. On #18 above, why did you circle the number you circled? 
PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL: 
19. Were you thinking anything else when you first started the last task? 
PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL: 
20. If you ever failed to stop the noise during the shuttlebox task, this was 
primarily due to the fact that: 
RATE HOW STRONGLY YOU BEUEVE EACH STATEMENT 
A. You did not figure out or use the correct strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly disagree Strongly Agree 
B. It was impossible to stop the noise 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly disagree Strongly Agree 
(Continued on next page) 
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C. You did not try hard enough 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly disagree Strongly Agree 
D. 
Fill in another reason if you desire 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly disagree Strongly Agree 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
21. How important was it for you to make a good impression on the 
experimenter during the entire experimenter? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not important at all Very important 
22. How interesting was the entire experiment to you? 
PLEASE READ THE CHOICES CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE YOUR RATING 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not interesting at all Very interesting 
23. Other than what the experimenter has already told you, do you think you 
know the specific purpose or the specific predictions of the experiment? 
CIRCLE ONE 
YES NO 
IF "YES." PLEASE ELABORATE: 
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APPENDIXE 
Schematic Representation of the Method 












ADMINISTRATION OF ASQ AND TSCS 




ADMINISTRATION OF MAACL1 AND EXPECTANCY RATING 1 
BLOCK 1 (PRETREATMENT PHASE) 
ADMINISTRATION OF MAACL2 
BLOCK 2 (PRETREATMENT PHASE) 
ADMINISTRATION OF MAACL3 AND EXPECTANCY RATING 2 
BLOCK 3 (TEST PHASE) 





One of the questionnaires that you filled out during Mass Testi.."lg gave 
us some information about your general personality style. The general 
purpose of the experiment is to find out how people with certain personality 
styles solve a variety of tasks. Your responses to that earlier questionnaire as 
well as your performance during this experiment are completely confidential. 
During the upcoming experiment, you will be exposed to a slightly 
unpleasant noise which will be administered through a set of headphones. 
The noise is not considered dangerous, but individuals with ear or hearing 
problems should refrain from participating in the study. Prior to the 
experiment, you will be asked to select a tone that you judge to be "slightly 
unpleasant." This will be the tone intensity that will be administered 
periodically throughout the experiment. During the experiment, you will be 
asked to sit and listen to these tones, and you may, at times, be asked to figure 
out a way to turn off the tones. Also, you will be asked to complete several 
brief questionnaires as part of the experiment. 
This project will benefit you in that you will be able to experience 
psychological research firsthand, as an experimental subject. You will also be 
allowed to ask questions about the project at the end of the experiment. This 
project will benefit mankind in that it may add to what we currently know 
about certain personality types and their behavior. 
The entire experiment should take approximately one and a half 
hours. You will receive mo. research experience credits for your participation 
or financial compensation as discussed by you and the individual who 
contacted you about participating in this project. You are free to withdraw 
from this experiment at any time and you will still receive research credit 
and/ or compensation should you choose to withdraw. All data obtained from 
you will be assigned a code number, and only the experimenter will have 
access to these data. Upon completion of this project, all identifying 
information will be destroyed and all data will be secured by the 
experimenter. Any questions that you may have will be answered by the 
experimenter at the end of the study. 
(Continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX F (cont.) 
Informed Consent 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO 
Consent to Act as a Human Subject 
Subject's Name __________________________________________ _ 
Date of Consent __________________________________________ _ 
I hereby consent to participate in the research project entitled 
Personality Style and Task Performance. An explanation of the procedures 
and/ or investigations to be followed and their purpose, including any 
experimental procedures was provided to me by 
----------· I was also informed about any risks, benefits, 
or discomforts that I might expect. I was given the opportunity to ask 
questions regarding the research and was assured that I am free to withdraw 
my consent to participate in the project at any time without penalty or 
prejudice. I understand that I will not be identified by name as a participant in 
this project. 
I have been assured that that the explanation I have received regarding 
this project and this consent form have been approved by the University 
Institutional Review Board which ensures that research projects involving 
human subjects follow federal regulations. If you have any questions about 
this, I have been told to call the Office of Research Services at (919) 334-5878. 
I understand that any new information that develops during the 
project will be provided to me if that information might affect my willingness 
· to continue participation in the project. In addition, I have been informed of 
the compensation/treatment or absence of compensation/treatment should I 
be injured in this project. 





**READ TinS ONLY IF SUBJECT SCORES OVER 20 ON THE BDI. 
Unfortunately, due to your responses on the questionnaire I just gave you, I 
won't be able to present the whole experiment to you. But I will (give you the 
research credit/money) I promised anyway. 
Also, just in case you ever want to talk with someone, I'll give you a list of 
agencies and their phone numbers. Thank you for showing up today. 
(B) 
**READ TillS ONLY IF SUBJECT BECOMES VERY DISTRESSED AS A 
RESULT OF PARTICIPATING IN THE EXPERIMENT OR IF SUBJECT'S 
RESPONSES ON THE DACL INDICATE THE NEED FOR SPECIAL 
ATTENTION. 
I apologize for this being upsetting to you. I want to do whatever it takes to 
make sure you feel alright about this or at least have an opportunity to talk 
with someone about this. Let me give you a few names and phone numbers. 




Thank you for your participation in this study. The main purpose of 
this study is to determine if individuals with certain personality styles 
perform worse on the shuttlebox task (the last phase of the experiment) and 
become more depressed when they are first exposed to an uncontrollable 
tone. Some experimental subjects ~ able to terminate the noise in the first 
phase by pressing the space bar four times. Other subjects are .tQld that they 
caii. controi the tone somehow, when, in actuality, they can't. A third group of 
subjects is just told to simply sit and listen to the tones in the first part of the 
experiment. They are not told to try to terminate the noise. 
In the first phase of the experiment, you were in the group that 
In the last phase of the experiment, it was possible for all subjects, 
including you, to turn off the noise by moving the cursor on the computer 
monitor, from the left box to the right box by pressing the right key and the 
top key in an alternating fashion. To move from the right box to the left box, 
you had to alternate the left and top keys. Did you ever figure out that you 
could completely avoid the noise by moving the cursor across the screen 
when that big square warning signal came on? 
YES NO 
If YES, ask the following: When you fim moved the cursor before the noise 
came on , what was the reason: 
A. Because you accidently hit a certain key before the noise came on 
and noticed that t.he lLTte of stars appeared? 
B. Because you were just playing around with the keys and noticed that 
the line of stars appeared. 
C. You actually thought that there might be a way to completely avoid 
the noise, so you purposely tried to respond before the tone came on. 
The questionnaire you filed out during Mass Testing (SCID-II-Self-
Report) helpled us determine what your personality type is. However, this 
questionnaire only gives us an indication of your personality and it is not 
entirely accurate. Therefore, it would be irresponsible for me to provide you 
with individual feedback on your personality. 
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GROUP B SUBJECIS ONLY 
Again, you were in the first phase group that could not terminate the 
noise. Nobody in your group can terminate the noise. I'm sorry that I led you 
on by telling you that you .cmilit terminate the noise. I hope that it wasn't too 
frustrating for you. It was important for me to make you believe that you 
could terminate the noise, so I had to deceive you a little. People react in 
different ways when I do this and it would be helpless to hear about your 
thoughts and feelings on this. __ . How do you feel about the fact that I 
deceived you? __ . Does this bother you? __ . 
IF SUBJECT IS VERY UPSET, GO TO SPECIAL DEBRIEFING (B) 
ALL SUBJECTS 
Was there anything that bothered you about the experiment? 
Do you want to talk about it? 
Any comments or questions about anything? 
__ Administer DACL (If DACL indicates the need for special attention or if 
the subject is noticeably upset, go to Special Debriefing (B)) 
IMPORTANT TO SAY TO ALL SUBJECTS: 
**Please do not tell your friends about this experiment. I test alot of students 
here at UNCG and I want to be sure that all of my research subjects know 
nothing about the details of the experiment before they participate. If a 
research subject knows what the experiment is all about, that could mess up 
my experiment. Do you understand? 
**Before going, I just wanted to get your permission again to use the 
information we've collected on you today. Is it alright? 
YES NO 
**Thanks again for participating in our experiment. 





Schematic Representation of Possible Relationship 












(e.g., Duration of Perceived Uncontrollability or 
Degree of Perceived Uncontrollability) 
ffiGH 
Environmental Context Response Topography 
LOW OC Behavior, LOW Depression 
ffiGH OC Behavior, LOW Depression + 
ffiGH OC Behavior, HIGH Depression 
LOW OC Behavior, HIGH Depression 1\ 
1. "LOW" 
2. "MODERATELY LOW" 
3. ''MODERATELY ffiGH" 
4. "HIGH" 
+ OC Behavior successfully "defends" against depression. 




Radical Behaviorism and Learned Helplessness 
Investigating the helplessness phenomenon from alternative 
perspectives could potentially strengthen the theory outlined by Seligman 
(1975). Alternative methods, language systems, and theoretical emphases 
might serve to address many of the criticisms leveled against the theory and 
improve the theory's ability to predict and control behavior without 
necessarily having to completely abandon it. Most theorists, while perhaps 
differing on details, probably agree that the purported mechanism-"perceived 
uncontrollability"--however defined, does, in fact, influence the onset of 
depression in certain individuals. One such alternative perspective on this 
mechanism, a radical behavioral perspective, will be briefly offered here for 
illustrative purposes. Other perspectives should be explored and capitalized 
upon as well. 
If one were to stretch his or her imagination and translate the cognitive 
language of learned helplessness into radical behavioral terms, she or he 
might be able to conceptualize learned helplessness as one specific example of 
Ferster's more general functional analysis of depression-a theory briefly 
mentioned in the introduction and one which suggests that the depressed 
individual has a defective behavioral repertoire due to, for example, sudden 
environmental changes (e.g., uncontrollability). This defective repertoire 
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decreases the likelihood of positive reinforcement and increases the chances 
of aversive consequences, eventually resulting in extinction. Perhaps the 
learned helplessness deficits/disruptions discussed in the literature are in 
some way analogous to this exti..."lction. If t-rus is true, then Ferster's more 
general analysis could perhaps account for learned helplessness in its entirity. 
Some might argue then, that learned helplessness theory does not add 
anything to the more general analysis, and thus, is superfluous. However, in 
defense of the learned helplessness theory, it could be argued t.~t its 
narrower scope still sheds light on particular cases of depression, which may 
have important practical treatment and prevention implications. 
Radical behaviorism, a non-mediational approach, avoids such 
cognitive-behavioral notions as "perceived uncontrollability." Yet, it still may 
be able to address this mechanism from within its theoretical framework, 
capitalizing upon Skinner's rule governed behavior. Recall, rule-governed 
behavior was briefly addressed in the introduction when rigidity of thought 
was argued to be a behavior within the obsessive compulsive's repertoire. 
Skinner (1966, 1969) defines "rules" as verbal behaviors that serve as 
"contingency-specifying stimuli." They are provided by a "speaker" and either 
followed or not followed by a "listener." The listener is, in essence, governed 
by two sets of contingencies; one set, the actual contingencies that the rule 
specifies, and the other set, the socially-mediated consequences of rule-
following. Rule-governed behavior is distinguised from contingency-shaped 
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behavior in that the listener, in rule governed behavior, may have never 
been exposed to the natural contingencies that the rule specifies before the 
rule was actually delivered. In contingency-shaped behavior, behavior is 
entirely controlled by the natural consequences of the situation. 
Rules are followed by most people for several reasons. It may-be quite 
efficient for an individual to follow rules due to t.l-te fact that that rule-
governed behavior (unlike contingency-shaped behavior) does not 
necessarily rely on a detailed history of reinforcement. Also, an individual 
may follow rules because of the pliance contingencies added by the rules that 
may actually control responding and render the individual "insensitive" to 
the natural tracking contingencies. Zettle and Hayes (1982) define "pliance" as 
"rule-governed behavior primarily under the control of apparent speaker-
mediated consequences for correspondence between a rule and relevant 
behavior (p. 9)" and they define "tracking" as "rule-governed behavior under 
control of the apparent correspondence between a rule and the way the world 
is arranged (p. 10)." 
These two types of rule-following, pliance and tracking, may be either 
beneficial (e.g., promote adaptive functioning) or detrimental (e.g., lead to the 
development of irrational cognitions). 
According to Skinner (1969), "self'-rules are similar to rules except for 
the fact that the "speaker" and "listener" are the same person. In other words, 
"self'-rules are unique in that they are created by (i.e., "extracted from" the 
natur=-1 contingencies) and adhered to by the same individual. No doubt, 
however, the distinction between the role of the "speaker" and "listener" 
within the individual is often blurred. 
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As Zettle and Hayes (1982) assert, "self''-rules are often complicated in 
that they cannot be directly manipulated like ordinary rules that involve an 
interchange between at least two people. In addition, it may be extremely 
difficult to determine whether a "self'-rule controls a given response or is 
only a "collateral response" to another variable. 
Like ordinary rules, "self'-rules may be followed primarily because of 
pliance contingencies or tracking contingencies. Also, like ordinary rules, 
forming and following "self'-rules may be advantageous in that this may 
increase the efficency of responding and guarantee that effective behaviors 
will be maintained under adverse contingency-shaped conditions. However, 
it is quite possible that "self'-rules, like ordinary rules, may have a negative 
effect on behavior as well. It is feasible to suggest that some forms of 
psychopathology may, in fact, result from the formulation of and/or 
following of "self'-rules. 
To elaborate on the study cited earlier, SchneichrJ.ller (1987), in her 
dissertation, investigated the role of rule-governed behavior in obsessive 
compulsive and histrionic personality disordered analogues. An 
experimental procedure originated by Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, and 
Greenway (1986) was utilized. Specifically, Schneidmiller exposed personality 
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disordered analogu.es and a control group to an Acquisition/Extinction 
computer task, where all subjects were given an accurate rule that helpled 
them successfully manipulate two telegraph keys under two different 
alternating conditions {FR/DRL MULT). Successfully manipulating the 
telegraph keys enabled subjects to move a Plus Sign presented in the upper 
left hand cell of a 5 by 5 grid displayed on a computer monitor to the lower 
right hand cell of the grid, resulting in the accumulation of points. Subjects 
first mastered this acquistion phase of the experiment. Next all subjects were 
placed on extinction, where the rule was no longer accurate and the task was 
no longer controllable. On the one hand, in this phase, as predicted, 
Schneidmiller found that the behavior of the obsessive compulsive 
analogues was more under the control of the rule rather than under the 
control of the natural contingencies, given that their responding was slow to 
extinguish. On the other hand, she found that the behavior of the histrionic 
analogues was more under the control of the natural contingencies rather 
than the rule, given that their responding was quick to extinguish. The 
extinction curve of the control subjects fell between the two analogues. 
Schneidmiller argued that that these two disorders might be related to 
dysfunctional rule-governed behavior, with obsessive compulsives 
demonstrating "excessive" rule-governed behavior and histrionics 
demonstrating "deficits" in this area. 
Zettle and Hayes (1982) suggest that in addition to a relationship with 
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personality disorders, perhaps a relationship between dysfunctional ("self'-) 
rule formulation/following and depression can be drawn. They speculate that 
Beck's conception of irrational schemas/ cognitions (e.g., "I most be loved by 
everyone") can be reinterpreted in radical behavioral language as 
dysflli"Lctional rule-governed, verbal behavior. They argue that this 
reinterpretation could potentially offer certain advantages, among them: (a) 
Skinner's radical behaviorism might offer a fresh alternative framework 
from which to conceptualize psychopathology and the treatment of 
psychopathology; (b) it might serve to expand the scope of traditional 
behavioral therapies; and (c) it might encourage the investigation of 
environmental sources of phenomena traditionally viewed as innate or 
automatic (i.e., schemas, attributional style). 
Many of the cognitive theories of depression (e.g., Beck, Seligman) 
argue that inflexible cognitive schemas, cognitive sets, or attributional styles 
are at least partly responsible for the onset of depression; that these 
"cognitions" color the perceptions of the organism, decreasing the probability 
of tacti.ng "reality," and hence, increasing the probability of a depressive 
event. 
Perhaps, as Zettle and Hayes suggest with regard to Beck's conception of 
irrational cognitions, t.~e "perceived uncontrollability"--the critical 
mechanism for helplessness induction-is also an overextended rule derived 
from the verbal community and/or a maladaptive "self-rule" extracted from 
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the natural contingencies. This rule or self-rule, perhaps one time based in 
"truth," currently renders the organism "insensitive" to the natural 
contingencies, and prevents the organism from capitalizing on the potential 
reinforcements inherent in these contingencies. Interestingly, treatments 
derived from both Beck's and Seligman's models encourage the client to 
dispute irrationality and to tact the natural contingencies. "Dragging the 
helpless dog" to the safe compartment of the shuttlebox is in many respects 
similar to "hypothesis testing" in cognitive therapy-in both, the old, 
resistant, and faulty contingency "shackles" are removed, freeing the 
organism to tact new, "healthy," more reinforcing contingencies. 
Critics of Seligman as well as the results of the present dissertation 
illustrate some inadequacies of the learned helplessness model. While the 
helplessness attributional reformulation determined it necess~y to address 
the organismic variable of explanatory style in order better to predict 
helplessness, a radical behavioral perspective would probably go a step 
further, insisting on a more thorough functional analysis including an 
investigation of the individual's learning history. The present study, while 
not radical behavioral in its focus, attempted to investigate other organismic 
variables-personality factors shaped up through a learning history-that 
increase the probability of helplessness induction and generalization. This 
study points to t..lte importance of personality factors (i.e., learning history) as 
a mediator in the onset of helplessness. But it is also clear based on the 
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findings that the phenomenon learned helplessness attempts to address is 
complex and difficult to produce, predict, and assess under the best of 
conditions. Considerable attention will need to be paid to addressing these 
complexities and difficulties and alternative perspectives may be 
instrumental in such an endeavor. 
